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ABSTRACT. Low-intensity state-sponsored cyber attacks exist within a "gap" in public inter-
national law. Falling short of the definitions of use of force and intervention, these attacks are not
clearly governed by international law. Some scholars have sought to stretch established interna-
tional legal categories to resolve this problem, while others have suggested new treaty regimes
for cyberspace altogether. I suggest an alternative: liability for the duty to prevent and redress
transboundary harms. By examining the origins of this duty, this Note identifies how liability for
the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harms might apply for low-intensity cyber at-
tacks, an increasingly common and destructive category of attacks.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 2014, a menacing red skull flashed on every employee's
screen at Sony Pictures Entertainment's headquarters in Culver City, Califor-
nia. The attackers, calling themselves the "Guardians of Peace," scrubbed more
than one hundred terabytes of Sony's data and leaked thousands of confidential
documents.' The attackers threatened to release more documents if Sony did
not stop the release of The Interview, Sony's newest political-satirical film on
North Korea, and made clear their intention to cause further harm and even vi-
olence.2 In the end, many theaters caved to the attackers' demands, refusing to
screen the film-but not before the attacks resulted in tens of millions of dol-
lars in damage,' including the destruction of Sony data systems,' the corrup-
tion of thousands of computers,s the loss of millions of dollars in revenues,6
7and leaked trade secrets.
In the aftermath of the attack, the U.S. government made an unprecedented
accusation, officially attributing the Sony attack to the government of North
1. See David Robb, Sony Hack: A Timeline, DEADLINE (Dec. 22, 2014,
1:25 PM), http://deadline.com/2o14/12/sony-hack-timeline-any-pascal-the-interview-north
-korea-1201325 5 01 [http://perma.cc/ZE2Q-MM5H].
2. See Catherine Shoard, Sony Hack: The Plot To Kill The Interview-a Timeline So Far, GUARDI-
AN (Dec. 18, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/film/2o14/dec/18/sony-hack
-the-interview-timeline [http://perma.cc/8T2Y-SDNT].
3. See Lianna Brinded, The Interview Tipped To Cost Sony Pictures $2oom Following Hack and
Cancellation, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/inter
view-tipped-cost-sony-pictures-200m-total-following-hack-cancellation-1 4 8o157 [http://
perma.cc/EJ8U-XT9B]. While the total damage to Sony is difficult to calculate, Sony has
indicated that the attacks cost the company at least $15 million. See Ryan Faughnder, Sony
Says Studio Hack Cost It $15 Million in Fiscal Third Quarter, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:07
AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-sony-hack-cost-20
150204-story.html [http://perma.cc/Q8S6-66XS]; Andrea Peterson, Why It's So Hard To
Calculate the Cost of the Sony Pictures Hack, WASH. PosT (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/o5/why-its-so-hard-to-calculate-the-cost-of
-the-sony-pictures-hack [http://perma.cc/S7RT-ZLNC].
4. See Amanda Hess, Inside the Sony Hack, SLATE (NOV. 22, 2015, 8:25 PM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/11/sony-employees-on thehack_one yearjlate
r.html [http://perma.cc/8VYZ-XCMA].
5. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Update on Sony Investigation (Dec.
19, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation
[http://perma.cc/4ZV4-BNSD].
6. See Brinded, supra note 3.
7. See Lisa Richwine, Cyber Attack Could Cost Sony Studio as Much as $ioo Million, REUTERS
(Dec. 9, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sony-cybersecurity-costs




Korea.' After an FBI investigation that linked the attack's code, infrastructure,
and overall design to previous attacks that were believed to have been carried
out by North Korea,' the State Department officially condemned North Korea
on December 19, 2014.10 In a special press release, President Obama vowed that
the United States would respond proportionally in the arena of its choosing."
International legal and technology experts have since hotly debated the at-
tribution of the Sony attack. Some have claimed that the United States
misattributed or prematurely attributed the attack to North Korea. 1 2 Others
have noted that the United States's actions could set a dangerous precedent.1
In any case, observers recognize that the United States's response was a key ex-
ample - now one of a steadily growing number 4 - of a state officially accusing
another of a cyber attack.s Yet even if attribution is possible, a more pressing
question for international law emerges: what international law has North Ko-
rea violated by committing this attack?
8. See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Attributes Cyberattack on Sony to North Korea, WASH. POST
(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-attributes
-sony-attack-to-north-korea/2014/12/19/fc3aec6o-879-11e4-a7o2-fa31ff4aeg8estory.html
[http://perma.cc/742A-8GCY] (noting that this was "the first time that the United States
has openly laid blame on a foreign government for a destructive cyber attack against an
American corporation").
9. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 5. For examples of techniques re-
lied upon by the U.S. government when tracing attacks, see APT1: Exposing One of China's
Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT (2013), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424
/docs/Cyber-o83.pdf [http://perma.cc/V294-8BXB].
1o. See Press Release, John Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Condemning Cyber-
Attacks by North Korea (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/12
/23 5444.htm [http://perma.cc/J9JK-5PRS].
1n. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Year-End Press Conference, WHITE
HOUSE (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/19/remarks
-president-year-end-press-conference [http://perma.cc/Y8PF-PPQY].
12. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Critics Say New Evidence Linking North Korea to the Sony Hack Is Still
Flimsy, -WIRED (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/2oi/oi/critics-say-new
-north-korea-evidence-sony-still-flimsy [http://perma.cc/43RF-ECJ9].
13. See, e.g., Robert M. Lee, The Feds Got the Sony Hack Right, but the Way They're Framing It Is
Dangerous, WIRED (Jan. 10, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2o15/oi/feds-got
-sony-hack-right-way-theyre-framing-dangerous [http://perma.cc/D6D9-B8Y3].
14. For example, the U.S. government has recently accused Russia of interfering in the U.S.
elections. See David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks To Influence
Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/1o/o8/us/politics/us
-formally-accuses-russia-of-stealing-dnc-emails.html [http://perma.cc/PSP6-747U].
15. See, e.g., Herb Lin, Learning from the Attack Against Sony, LAwFARE (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:38
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/learning-attack-against-sony [http://perma.cc/UTH9
-Z4 MD]; Nakashima, supra note 8.
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As surprising as it may seem, the traditional international legal perspective
seems to answer "none. Despite the increasingly common and destructive
nature of state-sponsored cyber attacks," it is difficult to locate the precise
source of illegality for these "low-intensity" cyber attacks.'" In the language of
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, states are only responsible for acts at-
tributable to the state that are "wrongful" under international law.19 Low-
intensity state-sponsored cyber attacks do not fit this bill. Scholars have recog-
nized this "gap" for low-intensity cyber attacks and sought solutions. Some
have tried to broaden current international legal categories of impermissible
conduct to cover these attacks. 0 Others have declared that a new treaty or legal
regime is needed before international law can render low-intensity attacks
wrongful.2 ' Neither approach has proved satisfactory thus far.
This Note proposes an important theoretical and practical alternative that
derives from a preexisting but underutilized source of international law: liabil-
ity for transboundary harm. Liability in international law is a complicated, con-
troversial, and often misunderstood concept that has developed separately
from, but directly feeds into, the customary international legal regime of state
responsibility. Liability does not emerge from a violation of international law
16. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 817, 820 (2012)
("Some have referred to these and similar attacks as 'cyber-warfare,' suggesting that the law
of war might apply. Yet the attacks look little like the armed conflict that the law of war tra-
ditionally regulates."); Michael Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 17 J. CONFLICT & SE-
cuRiTy L. 245, 246 (2012) ("Cyber operations have the potential for producing vast societal
and economic disruption without causing the physical damage typically associated with
armed conflict .... Moreover, massive attacks can be launched by a single individual or by a
group that is organized entirely on-line. This is in sharp contrast to traditional war-
fare....").
17. See Sean Watts, Low Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-Intervention, in
CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 249, 249-50 (Jens David Ohlin et al.
eds., 2015).
is. Under the doctrine of state responsibility, states are responsible for "wrongful" acts that are
(a) attributable to the state and (b) breaches of an international obligation. Int'l Law
Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, art. 2, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
U.N. Doc. A/56/io, at 68 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
ig. Id. art. 2, at 68.
20. See, e.g., WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 129-33 (1999).
21. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, Cyberinterference (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). For an analysis of why comprehensive treaty regimes are unlikely in cyberspace, see
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DUTIES OWED
per se, which would constitute wrongfulness (or even give rise to international
criminal responsibility), but rather, simply from an act of harm.
In particular, liability in international law derives from the customary duty
to prevent and redress transboundary harm. This duty is most familiar in the
environmental realm,22 despite its roots in and application to a broader range
of legal issues.23 International liability for a violation of this duty is triggered by
the "transboundary movement of . .. harmful effects" above. a certain level of
severity not traditionally tolerated,24 and involving a causal relationship be-
tween the damage caused and the activity causing it.25
To make the case for applying this liability approach to low-intensity state-
sponsored cyber attacks, this Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins by ex-
plaining why low-intensity cyber attacks appear to escape regulation under ex-
isting international legal obligations. Part II next examines the origins of the
duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm, which forms the basis of in-
ternational liability, and the complex relationship between liability and the doc-
trine of state responsibility. Part III applies liability for this duty to low-
intensity, state-sponsored cyber attacks. Part IV then turns to the three key
benefits of a liability approach for cyber attacks: (1) pragmatic appeal to states'
interests and emphasis on the duty to redress harms, (2) clarification of the lit-
erature on due diligence and countermeasures in international law, and (3)
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. For example, liability for transboundary harm has been pursued in the context of damages
caused by space objects and by misfired weapons and mines. The International Law Com-
mission (ILC) contemplated applying liability for transboundary harm to a broader range of
activities in its work in its work on "liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts
not prohibited by international law." See infra text accompanying notes 106-114.
24. XuE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2003) ("To be legally
relevant, damage should be at least 'greater than the mere nuisance or insignificant harm
which is not normally tolerated.") (quoting Int'l Law Comm'n, Sixth Report on Interna-
tional Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited By Interna-
tional Law, arts. 2(b), 2(e), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/428 (Mar. 15, 1990)). While Xue notes that
"international law only tacides those cases where transboundary damage has reached a cer-
tain degree of severity," different thresholds of severity are required for transboundary liabil-
ity "for different purposes and in different contexts." Id. at 7-8.
25. See id. at 4, 7-8. "Transboundary" refers to damages caused directly between two or more
states, as well as damages that have transcended boundaries. "Harmful effects" include
physical damage to persons or property, as well as intangible damages caused by economic
activities. "Severity" requires a factual inquiry particular to the circumstances of each inci-
dent, given that international law generally accepts liability only for damages "greater than
the mere nuisance or insignificant harm which is normally tolerated" by the international
community. Id. at 8. "Causation" requires a proximal, though not necessarily physical, link
between an activity and the ill effects produced. Id.
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acknowledgement of duties owed to third parties. This Note ultimately pro-
poses that liability for transboundary harm offers a fruitful approach for bring-
ing low-intensity cyber attacks into the fold of international law.
1. THE PUZZLE OF LOW-INTENSITY STATE-SPONSORED CYBER
ATTACKS
Before turning to liability for transboundary harm and how it might apply
in the cyber realm, this Part describes the problems posed by low-intensity
cyber attacks and why established international legal principles have proven in-
capable of regulating these attacks.
A. The Problem
A cyber attack is "any action taken to undermine the functions of a comput-
er network for a political or national security purpose." 26 Low-intensity cyber
attacks, specifically, encompass any of a wide range of actions taken to "alter,
disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy" computer systems or networks resulting
in destruction and coercion insufficient to amount to a use of force or interven-
tion under international law.27 As the latter half of this definition makes clear,
defining low-intensity cyber attacks inevitably involves a discussion of what
they are not: actions clearly governed by established international legal rules.
Here, I briefly explain why low-intensity cyber attacks merit attention and why
bringing law to bear on them is a worthwhile goal in the first place.
First, low-intensity cyber attacks are incredibly costly. Experts suggest that
the average large U.S. company spends more than $7.7 million on preventing
and responding to cyber attacks each year, a relatively high amount compared
to that spent by large foreign companies.28 Around the world, the numbers are
26. Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 826.
27. The National Research Council defines cyber attacks as actions intending to "alter, disrupt,
deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the information
and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks." NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAw, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE
OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 10-11 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009); see Christopher S.
Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar? International Law, Domestic Law, and Self-Protective
Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS, supra note 17, at 175; Mi-
chael Schmitt, International Law and Cyber Attacks: Sony v. North Korea, JUST SECURITY
(Dec. 17, 2014, 9:29 AM), http://www.justsecurity.org/1846o/international-humanitarian
-law-cyber-attacks-sony-v-north-korea [http://perma.cc/R38E-G43Q].





similarly startling: cyber attacks result in more than $400 billion in losses to
companies each year,29 and potentially as much as $2.1 trillion in losses by
2019.30 While governments and private entities have dramatically boosted their
cyber security in recent years, experts remain convinced that even the best secu-
rity precautions remain incapable of eliminating all vulnerability to future at-
tacks." This is troubling, given that even a single vulnerability can open the
door to considerable destruction; the attack on Sony, for instance, resulted in
the destruction of three thousand computers and eight hundred servers.32
Moreover, low-intensity cyber attacks are incredibly common. While much
scholarly attention has focused on the threat of major cyber attacks that border
on acts of war, the most common cyber attacks fall considerably below this lev-
el. In 2015, only 2.4% of all cyber attacks were conducted in the context of war
or gave rise to a degree of physical damage approaching a use of force.33 In fact,
experts agree that "[f]ew, if any, cyber operations have [ever] crossed the
armed attack threshold."34 The need for legal restrictions on and remedies for
cyber attacks is no less severe given the immense impact that these attacks have
on personal and state property.
-8G6B]. Others suggest an even larger average cost to U.S. firms. See James Griffiths, Cyber-
crime Costs the Average U.S. Firm $15 Million a Year, CNN (Oct. 8, 2015, 3:28 AM), http://
money.cnn.com/201 5 /1o/o8/technology/cybercrime-cost-business [http://perma.cc/PR7J
-HLP4 1]
29. Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (June
2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8GQM-W5P9]; Will Yakowicz, Companies Lose $4oo Billion to Hackers
Each Year, INC. (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/cyberattacks-cost
-companies-400-billion-each-year.html [http://perma.cc/8PN8-M2FK].
30. Steve Morgan, Cyber Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019, FORBES (Jan. 17,
2016, 11:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2o16/o/17/cyber-crime-costs
-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2o19 [http://perma.cc/4FGK-5FD4]. However, these fig-
ures remain rough estimates because the costs that result from privacy infringements and
intellectual property losses remain difficult to calculate.
31. See ERIC COLE, ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT: UNDERSTANDING THE DANGER AND How To
PROTECT YOUR ORGANIZATION 27 (2013).
32. See Steve Kroft, The Attack on Sony, CBS (Apr. 12, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news
/north-korean-cyberattack-on-sony-6o-minutes [http://perma.cc/XXS2-ZGSB]. Another
attack, which took place in 2012, was believed to have been carried out by Iran on Saudi Ara-
bia's national oil company, Aramco, destroyed thirty thousand computers. See id.
33. Paulo Passeri, 2015 Cyber Attacks Statistics, HACKMAGEDDON (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.hack
mageddon.com/2016/o1/11/2015-cyber-attacks-statistics [http://perma.cc/WvB5W-8USZ].
34. Michael N. Schmitt, "Below the Threshold" Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response
Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 697, 698 (2014).
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Third, even if it were possible to expand existing categories of law to en-
compass low-intensity cyber attacks, doing so could create havoc in other areas
of law. As the next Section and Part IV explain, expanding the concepts of non-
intervention and sovereignty in international law could result in problems for
NGOs and other supporters of human rights who engage in political activities
abroad. Such an expansion would also complicate our understandings of which
routine cross-border infringements constitute violations of international law."s
Depending on how existing bodies of international law are broadened,
states might also either lose the right to respond "in kind" to low-intensity
cyber attacks, or conversely, gain the right to respond with disproportionately
numerous counterattacks.3 6 But such measures may be unsustainable, as escala-
tions are likely to mount over time if states are permitted to respond to low-
intensity attacks without restriction. For instance, after the Sony attack, it ap-
pears likely that a portion of North Korea's internet was temporarily knocked
offline although it is unclear who mounted the response." Like the initial Sony
hack itself, such counterattacks are, by their nature, difficult to control. Subse-
quent miscalculations, human coding error, and varying perceptions of the
damage can lead a response to cause even greater destruction and more severe
legal consequences than was initially intended.3 ' Nevertheless, the alternative -
35. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Drawbacks and Dangers of-Active Defense, in 6TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT: PROCEEDINGS 39, 43-44 (P. Brangetto et al. eds., 2014),
http://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyCon_201 4 .pdf [http://perma.cc
/9LS8-3B6E].
36. For countermeasures (the appropriate term if the underlying attack is considered illegal, and
if the response to it involves methods that too would be considered illegal if not in this con-
text), see Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, art. 49, at 328-33. For retor-
sions (the appropriate term if the response involves only unfriendly, but not illegal, actions),
see Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, in MAX PIANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. (Mar.
2011), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/o.1o93/law:epil/9 7 801 9 9 23 16 9o/law-9 7 8o1 9 9 23 169 o
-e983 [http://perma.cc/JZT7-CV6P].
37. Martin Faclder, North Korea Accuses U.S. of Staging Internet Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/world/asia/north-korea-sony-hackling-the
-interview.htnl [http://perma.cc/E6MK-DWRG].
38. See Angela McKay et al., International Cyber Security Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-
Dependent World, MICROsOFT 4 (2014), http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details
.aspx?id=45031 [http://perma.cc/5F7A-5HCM] ("Given the interconnected nature of cyber-
space and the speed and nature of cyber attacks, the effects of offensive operations might be
very difficult to predict and/or limit, and they could cascade to affect operations beyond the
intended targets, including critical functions in the energy, communications, banking,
chemical, or transportation sectors, among others. In other instances, an offensive cyber op-
eration gone wrong could disrupt the global Internet or corrupt data at a scale that impedes




leaving low-intensity cyber attacks unaddressed-may also have a corruptive
effect on the international legal order.3 9 By encouraging self-help, unfriendly
action, and non-cooperation, this option has the potential to blur the funda-
mental boundary between peace and conflict and thereby generate heightened
anxiety about future destruction.40
Therefore, a response to low-intensity cyber attacks is necessary, but as the
next Section explains, an adequate response is unavailable under traditional le-
gal frameworks.
B. The Gap in International Law
In this Section, I consider a number of legal rules that lack clear application
to low-intensity cyber attacks, including international law on the use of force,
intervention, armed conflict, and respect for state sovereignty.
The prohibition on the use of force-which the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) has declared a "cornerstone of the United Nations Charter" -is the
most natural place to look for international law applicable to low-intensity
cyber attacks.4 ' Article 2(4) of the UN Charter proclaims, "All Members shall
refrain . .. from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."4 2 While the scope of Article 2(4)'s prohibition
on the use of force is hotly debated,43 the object and purpose of the UN Char-
ly escalate hostilities from the keyboard to kinetics, in the absence of normative limits on
such behaviors.").
39. See id. at 4; infra notes 253-254 (describing how an error in the Stuxnet code led to its unin-
tentional, albeit benign, spread to computers around the world).
40. See McKay et al., supra note 38, at 4 ("[T]he increasing development of defensive and offen-
sive cyberspace capabilities will, in itself, promote cyber insecurity between nation states,
especially without a normative framework around those capabilities. If a state, for example,
shifts cybersecurity investments from civilian defense and law enforcement to offensive mili-
tary capabilities, other states will react. The actions of individual nation states could exacer-
bate cyber insecurity regionally or globally, driving broader tensions in the international sys-
tem.").
41. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19). This prohibition is also provided for in customary interna-
tional law. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 385
(Feb. 26).
42. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
43. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 30 (3 d ed. 2008).
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ter44 and its travaux prdparatoires" support a conclusion that Article 2(4) likely
refers to "armed force,"' 6 or at least to incidents giving rise to significant physi-
cal damage.4 7 Adapting the prohibition on the use of force to cyber attacks, the
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn
Manual), a NATO-commissioned study produced by an international group of
experts on the legality of cyber conflicts, has relied on this traditional approach.
The Tallinn Manual reasons that only cyber attacks of sufficient "severity," "in-
vasiveness," and "military character" amount to uses of force.
44. U.N. Charter, pmbl. ("We the people of the United Nations determined ... to ensure, by
the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest . . . have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish
these aims.").
45. U.N. Conference on Int'l Orgs., Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee
I/1, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
331, 334 (1945). The travaux prdparatoires (meaning "preparatory works") are the official rec-
ords of a negotiation.
46. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (5th ed. 1998); 1
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 208 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2012); Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 842; see also Bert V. A. R6ling, The Ban on the Use
of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 3
(A. Cassese ed., 1986) (finding it "obvious" that Article 2(4) refers to armed force);
Katharina Ziolkowski, General Principles of International Law as Applicable in Cyberspace, in
PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 135, 172-74 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013) (summon-
ing multiple lines of evidence for the proposition that Article 2(4) refers to armed force, and
describing actions to which Article 2(4) might apply).
47. The travaux prdparatoires suggest that participants of the San Francisco Conference in April
1945, which culminated in a draft of the UN Charter, specifically rejected an amendment
that would have included economic coercion within the scope of Article 2(4). See U.N. Con-
ference on Int'l Orgs., supra note 45, at 334; see Yoo, supra note 27, at 178-79. In addition to
rejecting such a proposal by Brazil to include economic force, the Conference also declined
to take up Iran's suggestion to include political force in the prohibition. See Nico Schrijver,
The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN Charter, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 470-71 (Marc Weller ed., 2015). In addition, the prevailing
consensus that Article 2(4) only applies to "armed force" is supported by arguments that Ar-
ticle 2(4) was drafted with the goal to limit unilateral recourse to specifically "armed" con-
flict. See Hathaway, supra note 35, at 43-44; see also Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber
Force and International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw, supra, at 1110-13 (discussing negotiations concerning the use of force defini-
tion).
48. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 48-52 (Mi-
chael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. Rule 11 of the Tallinn Manual
specifically notes that "[a] cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and




In light of the Tallinn Manual and a growing consensus in favor of such an
"effects-based" approach,49 low-intensity cyber attacks appear to escape prohi-
bition under Article 2(4), because they typically fail to cause the extensive
physical destruction necessary to meet the traditional definition of use of
force.50 For example, while the Sony attack resulted in the destruction of more
than three-quarters of Sony's main studio computers, 1 most scholars agree
that this destruction is not comparable to destruction caused by kinetic opera-
tions and therefore is beyond the scope of use of force under international
law.52
Second, unless low-intensity cyber attacks take place within the context of a
preexisting international armed conflict, they are not clearly governed by the
49. See, e.g., OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS (2d ed., 1999), reprinted in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 459, 483 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 1999)
("[T]he consequences are likely to be more important than the means used.") Schmitt, su-
pra note 47, at 1113-16; Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, International
Law in Cyberspace: Remarks at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept.
18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARv. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2012). It should be noted, however,
that direct use of weapons by a state is not required to violate the prohibition, as enabling
other actors to use such weapons can constitute a violation as well. See MARCO ROSCINI,
CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 66-67 (2014) ("In
the Nicaragua judgment, the I.C.J. also qualified the arming and training of armed groups -
not directly destructive actions -as a use of force.").
50. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, at 47.
51. See David E. Sanger & Michael S. Schmidt, More Sanctions on North Korea After Sony Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ol/o3/us/in-response-to-sony
-attack-us-levies-sanctions-on-io-north-koreans.html [http://perma.cc/39NM-H58G].
52. See Koh, supra note 49, at 4 ("[I]f the physical consequences of a cyber attack work the kind
of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber attack should
equally be considered a use of force."); see also Erki Kodar, Computer Network Attacks in the
Grey Areas of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 BALTIC Y.B. INT'L L. 133, 139-40 (2009); Mi-
chael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts
on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 914-15 (1999). To date, the
Stuxnet attack, which destroyed nuclear centrifuges inside Iran's Natanz uranium enrich-
ment site, remains the only cyber attack widely accepted by scholars as a potential use of
force. See, e.g., Russell Buchan, Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interven-
tions?, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 212, 220-21 (2012). While debate nevertheless surrounds
the lower threshold of Article 2(4), some examples of cyber attack consequences clearly con-
stituting force have been suggested: a nuclear plant meltdown, the opening of a dam, or
even the disabling of air traffic such that planes crash. See Koh, supra note 49, at 4. For dis-
cussion of the lower bounds of the use of force threshold, particularly in the context of
blockades, see Penelope Neville, Military Sanctions Enforcement in the Absence of Express Au-
thorization?, in THE OXFoRD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 47, at 279-83.
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laws of armed conflict (jus in bello).s Under international law, "armed attacks,'
which encompass attacks involving the "most grave forms of the use of force,"5 4
trigger the right of a state to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as
well as the application of jus in bello.ss While some states, such as the United
States, maintain that armed attacks are synonymous with mere uses of force,5 6
it is clear that low-intensity cyber attacks fall short of either a use of force or an
armed attack, and thus do not give rise tojus in bello restrictions.s7
Third, low-intensity attacks also fail to qualify as unlawful "interven-
tions."s Customary international law suggests that an intervention requires
"methods of coercion"" "bearing on matters in which each State is permitted,
by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely," such as its "political, eco-
s3. See Crootof, supra note 21. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts agreed that
an armed attack in cyberspace need not require "armed" employment of weapons, as injuries
to persons or damages to physical property may also meet the armed attack threshold. See
Yoo, supra note 27, at 18l.
54. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 91, ¶ 191 (June 27).
55. See U.N. Charter art. 51. Though there has been no clear agreement yet on whether such an
example has taken place, scholars nevertheless agree that it is possible for a cyber attack to
meet the threshold of an "armed attack" if its effects approach those of kinetic armed attack.
See Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 836-37; Kodar, supra note 52, at 139-40; Schmitt, supra
note 52, at 914-15; Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future
ofArticle 2(4), 36 YALEJ. INT'LL. 421, 427 (2011).
56. See Koh, supra note 49, at 7. But see Hathaway, supra note 35, at 49 ("[T]he UN Charter does
not permit states to respond with force to every single illegal use of force-in particular, to
those uses of force that do not arise to the "most grave" level sufficient to amount to an
"armed attack" and trigger Article 51.").
57. See Schmitt, supra note 27.
S8. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 1o6, ¶ 202;
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 5 (Oct. 24, 1970); G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), ¶ 2 (Dec. 21, 1965). Attacks
which aim to change the outcome of an election may be more likely to constitute an inter-
vention, as opposed to a mere low-intensity cyber attack.
59. Oppenheim's International Law defines "intervention" as requiring interference that is "forci-
ble or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of
control over the matter in question. Interference pure and simple is not intervention." i OP-
PENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 432 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9 th ed. 2008).
Put another way, intervention "aims to impose a certain conduct of consequence on a sover-
eign state." Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB.
INT'L L. ¶ 1 (Apr. 2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/lo.1093/law:epil/978ol99231690
/law-978019923169o-e434 [http://perma.cc/3DBK-WFTV].
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nomic, social and cultural" system.60 Low-intensity cyber attacks struggle to
meet this definition because they are typically targeted at private entities, create
relatively localized harms within a state, and do not impact policy matters tra-
ditionally within the domaine riservi of the state - a necessary element of "co-
ercion" within the definition of intervention.62 While not every attack failing to
meet the definition of the use of force falls outside of the definition of interven-
tion, many do.63 The prohibition on intervention applies narrowly in cyber at-
tacks, because intervention has routinely required more than mere "interfer-
ence."64 For example, Iran's attack on the Sands Casino in 2014 resulted in more
than $40 million in damage to the Las Vegas Sands Corporation from de-
stroyed data and computer systems, yet the attack had no broader political im-
pact.65
Fourth, low-intensity cyber attacks initiated by states do not constitute
"cyber crime." International criminal law applies only to individual actors, not
6o. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107-08, ¶ 205. Nic-
aragua also uses the language of "political integrity." Id. at lo6, ¶ 202; see TALLINN MANUAL,
supra note 48, r. lo, cmt. lo, at 45.
61. See Schmitt, supra note 27; Katja S. Ziegler, Domaine R6serv, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 1 (Apr. 2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/o.1o93/law:epil/978o1992316
90/law-9780199231690-e1398 [http://perma.cc/JR6J-NNSH]. Oppenheim's International
Law explains that in addition to being closely linked to the concept of domaine riservi, the
principle of non-intervention is a "corollary of every state's right to sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence." 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 59, at
428.
62. While coercion remains key to most scholarly conceptions of intervention, Watts notes that
" [s]tates have not achieved or expressed consensus on a notion of coercion sufficient to con-
stitute intervention," much less in the cyber context. Watts, supra note 17, at 270.
63. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 27.
64. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. lo, cmt. 8, at 44-45; Schmitt, supra note 47, at
1113-17; Schmitt, supra note 27.
65. See Crootof, supra note 21; Benjamin Elgin & Michael Riley, Now at the Sands Casino: An Ira-
nian Hacker in Every Server, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 4 -12-i/iranian-hackers-hit-sheldon-adelsons-sands-casi
no-in-las-vegas [http://perma.cc/UHD2-DLMZ]; cf. Max Kutner, Alleged Dam Hacking
Raises Fears of Cyber Threats to Infrastructure, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2016, 8:12 AM), http://
www.newsweek.com/cyber-attack-rye-dam-iran-441940 [http://perma.cc/E46K-XPCS]
(describing an incident in which a hacker affiliated with the Iranian government allegedly
hacked a New York dam); Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, American Airlines, Sabre Said
To Be Hit in China-Tied Hacks, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2015, 5:oo AM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o1 5-08-0 7 /american-airlines-sabre-said-to-be-hit-in-hacks
-backed-by-china [http://perma.cc/B2RM-Q8TD] (describing a series of attacks on corpo-
rations related to the U.S. travel industry that were allegedly attributable to hackers linked to
China).
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tempted - albeit with limited success - to apply broader customary internation-
al law principles to the low-intensity cyber arena. After all, within the doctrine
of state responsibility, state action is wrongful when the conduct is "attributa-
ble to the State under international law" and "[c]onstitutes a breach of an in-
ternational obligation of the State."' Finding a source of such breached obliga-
tions would not only deem low-intensity cyber attacks wrongful, but would
also entitle injured states to seek cessation of the offense, reparation, assurances
of non-repetition, and perhaps even countermeasures if the offense contin-
ues.70 These approaches, however, have struggled to proscribe low-intensity
attacks as well.
For example, appeals to "sovereignty"" and "territorial sovereignty"7 ' do
not provide a firm legal basis for outlawing low-intensity cyber attacks. "Sover-
eignty" is difficult to apply in this context in part because some scholars and
governments openly regard cyberspace as part of the global commons," in
which states cannot maintain or demand absolute control.7 ' Additionally, there
is no definitive understanding of how far a state's "territory" extends in cyber-
space. Even if there were, the obligation to respect state sovereignty may mere-
ly be co-extensive with the prohibition on intervention, given that non-
intervention is a direct corollary of state sovereignty.75
69. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, art. 2, at 68.
70. See id. arts. 30-31, 49.
71. See, e.g., Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?, 64 A.F. L. REV. 1, 31
(2009); Schmitt, supra note 27; see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (recognizing the "principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members").
72. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace,
89 INT'L L. STUD. 123 (2013), http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027
&context=ils [http://perma.cc/2LVQ-9Y8M]; see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judg-
ment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) ("Between independent States, respect for territorial sover-
eignty is an essential foundation of international relations.").
73. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT 12
(2005) ("The global commons consist of international waters and airspace, space, and cy-
berspace.").
74. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE's PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 251-52 (8th
ed. 2012).
75. Ian Brownlie explains that the "principal corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states"
include "(1) a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent popula-
tion living there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other
states." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 ( 5 th ed. 1998) (em-
phasis added); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 128, ¶ 251 (June 27) ("The effects of the principle of re-
spect for territorial sovereignty inevitably overlap with those of the principles of the prohibi-
tion of the use of force and of non-intervention."); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, su-
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Far more troublingly, historical practice weighs against any notion of an ab-
solute right of sovereignty in cyberspace.76 For centuries, states have remained
passive about establishing a legal regime to deal with routine intrusions into
state sovereignty, most notably intrusions in the form of covert action" and es-
pionage." Similarly, most states have been unwilling to accept a rigid ban on
pra note 59, at 428 (noting that non-intervention "is a corollary of every state's right to sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and political independence"); Kunig, supra note 59, 5 9
("Without the prohibition of intervention, the principle of sovereignty could not be fully re-
alized. Thereby, the raison d'Etre of the non-intervention rule is the protection of the sover-
eignty of the State.").
76. For more on why sovereignty and non-intervention should not be seen as absolute prohibi-
tions for all activity falling below the threshold of the use of force, see Ashley Deeks, An In-
ternational Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT'L L. 291, 302 (2015) ("[I]deas such
as non-intervention and sovereignty developed against a background understanding that
states do and will spy on each other, thus establishing a carve-out for espionage within those
very concepts.").
77. See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and Internation-
al Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1074-75 (20o6) ("There is little prospect ... of concluding
a convention defining the legal boundaries of intelligence gathering, if only because most
states would be unwilling to commit themselves to any standards they might wish to impose
on others."). See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT
ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AND AMERICAN LAw (1992) (reviewing contemporary covert actions and intelligence
policies).
78. See PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION: SPIES AND SPYING IN THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY (1986); Yoo, supra note 27, at 190-91 (noting that espionage dates to an-
cient Greece, Rome, China, and Egypt). The prevalence of espionage-and more recently,
cyber espionage - may remain a prime example of the Lotus principle at work: in the absence
of international law to the contrary, states simply have the right to act freely. Armin von
Bogdandy & Markus Rau, The Lotus, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. (June
20o6), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/o.1093/law:epil/978019923169o/law-9780199231690
-e162 [http://perma.cc/F2SY-DPEL].
The U.S. government defines cyber espionage as "[o]perations and related programs
or activities conducted ... in or through cyberspace, for the primary purpose of collecting
intelligence ... from computers, information or communication systems, or networks with
the intent to remain undetected." Presidential Policy Directive- U.S. Cyber Operations Policy
(PPD-2o) 2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf [http://perma.cc
/X6TL-FSM 3 ]. For the purposes of this Note, acts of cyber espionage are taken to be out-
side of the category of low-intensity cyber attacks to which liability applies, as they typically
lack destruction or corruption of computer or internet systems and equipment. However, if
an act of cyber espionage unintentionally or intentionally results in sufficient damage or co-
ercion, it could then constitute a low-intensity cyber attack, or a traditional non-
intervention, use of force, or armed attack under international law. See Yoo, supra note 27, at
183-84. The fact that the precise boundaries of the category of cyber espionage remain unset-
tled no doubt creates difficulties for defining the precise contours of any category of cyber




all cross-border cyber infringements. In part, this is because a ban might limit
their own cross-border covert intelligence, foreign political funding, and even
cyber activities." In addition, a definition of sovereignty that is too broad
might inadvertently cover a whole host of cross-border intrusions accepted in
an interconnected world, such as the extraterritorial effects of a state's tele-
communications, industrial, monetary, and environmental activities. At the
same time, subsuming all low-intensity cyber attacks into the dark nether-
worlds of the legally unclear category of espionage would reflect a total inabil-
ity of international law to prevent or even to provide redress for the resultant
damages.
Given this apparent gap for low-intensity cyber attacks in international law,
it appears less surprising that Secretary Kerry condemned North Korea for the
Sony attack by vaguely stating that North Korea had "violated international
norms'" but without expressly referencing any violation of international law.8 o
Similarly, President Obama simply called North Korea's attack "cyber vandal-
ism'" a term without any international legal meaning.8 ' In this way, the State
Department seemed to acknowledge the existence of such a gap, reflecting the
State Department's focus on cyber attacks constituting a use of force.82
II. LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
In light of these challenges, this Part argues that there is not actually a se-
vere non liquet in international law for cyber attacks that cause serious harm but
fail to qualify as intervention and use of force. However, identifying state du-
ties to address low-intensity cyber attacks requires turning away, at least ini-
tially, from the traditional concept of "wrongfulness" as affirmed in the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility and toward the concept of "liability" in interna-
tional law. This Part establishes the origin and nature of transboundary liabil-
and a low-intensity attack. However, for purposes of categorizing an attack (or part of an at-
tack) as a low-intensity cyber attack, the attack must result directly in damage, as opposed to
mere intrusion or extraction of information. In this context, it may be useful to note that
many recent attacks on government entities, such as the Office of Personal Management,
would not be categorized as low-intensity attacks as they have resulted mainly in infor-
mation extraction.
79. See Chesterman, supra note 77, at 1o75; Hathaway, supra note 35, at 49.
8o. Press Release, John Kerry, supra note o.
81. Eric Bradner, Obama: North Korea's Hack Not War, But 'Oybervandalism,' CNN (Dec. 24,
2014, 9:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2o1 4 /12/21/politics/obama-north-koreas-hack-not
-war-but-cyber-vandalism [http://perma.cc/TMZ6-W9WP].
82. See Koh, supra note 49, at 4.
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ity, the duties and standards that it entails, and the relationship between a lia-
bility-based regime and the customary international law doctrine of state re-
sponsibility.
A. Liability and the Duty To Prevent and Redress Transboundary Harm
Historically, the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm has roots
in the Roman law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which states that
each must use his property in a way that does not cause injury to another's."
This notion underlies the law of nuisance recognized in many legal systems
around the world."' For example, English common law has long imposed a du-
ty on property owners not to cause a nuisance that infringes upon another's use
and enjoyment of his land." French law similarly regards nuisance as the idea
that " [n] o one may cause an abnormal degree of inconvenience in the neigh-
borhood." 6
At common law, public nuisance may be considered a criminal wrong and
require a showing of infringement on property beyond that which is generally
"suffered by the public."" In contrast, liability for private nuisance has long at-
tached even where the defendant has used his land lawfully." In these instanc-
es, liability results from a property owner's activities giving rise to "encroach-
ment," "damage," or undue interference with a neighbor's "comfortable and
83. Elmer E. Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the State Police Power, 21
CORNELLL.Q. 276, 276-77 (1936). Some scholars also point to the notion of bon voisinage, or
"good neighborliness," as reflecting certain limitations (though not necessarily absolute) on
states not to abuse the rights of other states. See, e.g., Giinther Handl, Transboundary Im-
pacts, in OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 533 (Daniel Bodansky
et al. eds., 2008).
84. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Survey of Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of International
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 54 3 , reprinted in [2004] 2 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n pt. 1, at 85 [here-
inafter ILC Survey].
8s. See id. 5 56. Common law defines nuisance in tort as "an act or omission which is an inter-
ference with, disturbance of or annoyance to a person in the exercise or enjoyment of (a) a
right belonging to him as a member of the public (public nuisance), or (b) his ownership or
occupation of land or of some easement, profit or other right used or enjoyed in connection
with land (private nuisance)." Id. ¶ S3 (quoting R.A. Buckley, Nuisance, in CLARK & LIND-
SELL ON TORTS 973 (18th ed. 2003)).
86. Id. 5 52 (translating the French, "nul ne doit causer a autrui un trouble anormal du voisinage").





convenient enjoyment of his land.""9 In other words, "[i]t is sufficient in such
cases for the victim to show the inconvenience and its abnormal character"; the
plaintiff need not establish harm resulting from an act of negligence.90
In international law, the paramount case proclaiming liability for the duty
to prevent and redress transboundary harm is the 1941 Trail Smelter arbitration
between the United States and Canada. In assessing damages to the United
States from sulfur dioxide pollution caused by a Canadian smelter, the tribunal
held that "under the principles of international law .. . no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein."91
Over the decades, the ICJ has also invoked the duty to prevent and redress
transboundary harm on several occasions, mainly with respect to transbounda-
ry environmental damages. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion to the UN General
Assembly on the legality of the threat of using nuclear weapons, the ICJ recog-
nized "[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control," and noted that such an obligation is
"now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment."92
The duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm has since played a role in
a number of ICJ cases, including the court's 1997 Gablikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary v. Slovakia) judgment," 2010 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argen-
tina v. Uruguay) judgment," and 2015 Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicara-
gua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) judgment.9 s
Several settlements for liability for the duty to prevent and redress trans-
boundary harm have also taken place without much controversy. These include
the 1957 Lac Lanoux Arbitration between France and Spain9 6 and the Lake On-
8g. Id.
go. Id. 5 52 (in French, "un trouble anormal"). The 1868 English case Rylands v. Fletcher noted
that all significant harms, no matter "however innocently" inflicted, can give rise to liability
in private nuisance. Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] 3 LRE & I. App. 330, 341 (HL) (Cranworth,
J., concurring).
gi. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), ; R.I.A.A. i96s (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1941).
92. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-42
(July 8).
93. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (Sept. 25).
94. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 18, 9¶ 101, 193 (Apr. 20).
9S. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judg-
ment, 2015 I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 177-217 (Dec. 16).
96. Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
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tario Claims Tribunal established in 1965," as well as dozens of arbitrations be-
fore ad hoc tribunals.covering issues ranging from oil spills and factory pollu-
tion to damages caused by altering watercourses.98
While international tribunals have frequently addressed liability for trans-
boundary harm in the environmental context,99 there is no reason why liability
cannot be applied to transboundary harms in other settings. 00 Indeed, history
supports the application of liability for transboundary harm outside of the en-
vironmental context. Since the seventeenth century, scholars have recognized a
duty to remedy cross-border harm in a variety of contexts. Grotius stated that
from any "Fault or Trespass there arises an Obligation by the Law of Nature to
make Reparation for the Damage, if any be done."' Even in his time, interna-
tional law seemed to recognize a practice akin to liability: if one state owed tor-
tious damages to another, the state's failure to remedy the harm could be a just
cause of war itself.1 02 For instance, states whose commercial vessels were dam-
97. Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims, 8 I.L.M. 118, 133-42 (Lake Ontario
Claims Trib. 1969).
98. See ILC Survey, supra note 84.
99. See World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable De-
velopment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1 9 9/20 (Sept. 4,'2002); U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. i) (June 14, 1992) ("States have ... the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."); U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment, Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972) ("States
have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction."). The U.S. has recognized the principle of transboundary harm in the environ-
mental context. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
100. See GORAN LYStN, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY OF STATES FOR LAW-
FUL ACTS: A DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES 145-48 (1997) (describing debate on whether cus-
tomary international law provides for liability outside of treaties and suggesting that it
might). But see Allain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International Law, in THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 1o (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (concluding that
customary international law does not support a concept of liability outside of the environ-
mental context).
101. HUGO GROTIUS, 2 THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 884, ¶ 1 (Richard Tuck ed., Jean
Barbeyrac trans., 2005) (1625); see also Pellet, supra note loo, at 5 (quoting Grotius and stat-
ing that his "formulation formed the very basis of international responsibility until very re-
cently" and that it remains the foundation of the "classic theory" and "traditional defini-
tion").
102. See OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN To
OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 20-22 (forthcoming 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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aged by foreign ships could demand compensation not only from the owners of
the ships but also from the flag states of the foreign ships as well. Remnants of
this practice persist today. In 1971, Liberia accepted liability when the Liberian
tanker Juliana ran aground off the coast of a Japanese island. 13 Likewise, in
1972, Canada cited Trail Smelter to remind the United States of its obligations
when an oil tanker spilled near the state of Washington and polluted Canadian
beaches. 14
Over the course of the twentieth century, interest developed in clarifying
how international law applies to the increasing number of harms made possible
by the advancement of technology and growing interconnectedness of socie-
ty.'os In 1956, the International Law Commission (ILC) took up the project of
codifying the law of state responsibility.106 Though the project sought to define
responsibility for wrongful international acts, there emerged an understanding
that the "absence of wrongfulness [should] not prejudice compensation for
damages caused by states to one another."" Based on this logic, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly invited the ILC in 1977 "to commence work on the topic of in-
ternational liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited
by international law."'0 Since then, the ILC has produced dozens of reports on
the topic of liability, including the 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.' 9 While the ILC project ultimately
103. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶¶ 426-427.
104. See id.
1o5. See Michel Montjoie, The Concept of Liability in the Absence of an Internationally Wrongful Act,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note oo, at 503-04.
106. See James R. Crawford, State Responsibility, in MAX PIANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 6
(Sept. 20o6), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/978ol99231690/law-97 80199
231690-elo93 [http://perma.cc/4TYZ-BTE3]; Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special Rappor-
teur), Fourth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (June 27, 1983) [hereinafter Lia-
bility for Injurious Consequences].
107. Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12
(1990).
los. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/33/lo, at 75
(1978) (emphasis added); see also ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶¶ 1-4 (discussing the purpose
of the survey as reviewing liability conventions for actions not prohibited by international
law); Boyle, supra note 107, at 2-3 (noting that the ILC topic on "International Liability for
the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law" was an offshoot of
the group charged with distilling the doctrine of state responsibility into the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility).
iog. Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with
Commentaries, arts. 3, 7, 8, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its Fifty-Third
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dissolved, its conclusion with respect to liability remains relevant today:"o
where an activity "give[s] rise to loss or injury" across state boundaries, "repa-
ration [is] due" unless the harm has long been tolerated "in accordance with
the shared expectations of the States concerned.""'
No doubt the capacity of humans to cause catastrophic harms beyond tradi-
tional state boundaries in an increasingly interconnected world heavily influ-
enced the drafters of these ILC reports." 2 Yet while flood damage, pollution,
mine explosions, and nuclear radiation are frequently discussed by the working
group,"' ILC Special Rapporteur Robert Quentin-Baxter noted that there was
''never an intention to propose a reduction in the scope of the topic to questions
of an ecological nature, or to any other subcategory of activities involving the
physical uses of territory.""14
Session, U.N. Doc. A/ 56/io, at 370-77 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm]; see, e.g., G.A. Res. 65/28 (Dec. 6, 2010); G.A. Res. 62/68 (Dec. 6, 2007).
11o. As James Crawford has recalled, "Despite the uncertainty surrounding their future status,
the Draft Articles [on Transboundary Harm] provide an authoritative statement of the scope
of a state's international legal obligation to prevent a risk of transboundary harm." CRAw-
FORD, supra note 74, at 357.
iii. Liability for Injurious Consequences, supra note io6, annex § 4. Perhaps the most enduring
aspect of the ILC's work is its affirmation of the underlying purpose of liability. In the words
of the ILC Rapporteur, Quentin-Baxter, "[I]f all transboundary harm were wrongful, there
would be no need for this topic. Every activity that caused or threatened such harm would
be prohibited, except with the consent of the States whose interest was affected." Robert Q.
Quentin-Baxter (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Con-
sequences Arising Out ofActs Not Prohibited by International Law, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 3 4 6(July 1, 1981).
112. See Liability for Injurious Consequences, supra note io6, ¶ 60 (noting that as "international life
grows more complex and is more elaborately organized," liability, as opposed to wrongful-
ness, will be a more appropriate form of accountability); see also 4 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) ("[S]cientific and
technological advances . .. have obliged international law to adapt itself to new circumstanc-
es .... The problem posed by these new activities does not derive from the question wheth-
er they are legitimate or wrongful, but from the fact that, even if they are essential or benefi-
cial, they embody an inherent risk of transboundary harm.").
113. See ILC Survey, supra note 84. See generally Analytical Guide to the Work of the International
Law Commission, INT'L L. COMMIssION, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/gfra.shtml [http://
perma.cc/SB6V-6GSK] (organizing the work of the ILC by topics and helpfully tracking the
development of each topic).
114. Liability for Injurious Consequences, supra note io6, ¶ 17 ("[T]here is a rather general expecta-
tion that the field of application will include all physical uses of territory giving rise to ad-
verse physical transboundary effects."). Initially, the ILC project of codifying liability was
conceptualized in rather broad terms. See Boyle, supra note 107, at 96. For example, a 1995
ILC survey suggested that liability might extend to airspace, nuclear or industrial activities,




Outside of the ILC process, several prominent cases have appeared to apply
transboundary liability in non-environmental contexts. In the 1948 Corfu
Channel case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held Albania
responsible to the United Kingdom for mines laid in violation of "[e]very
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contra-
ry to the rights of other States.""' When read closely, it appears that the court
See Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic "International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law": Survey Prepared by the Secretariat,
[1995] 2 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n pt. 1, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/471. Documents suggest that
a debate existed between those who rejected the idea of focusing on the environment and
those who believed that liability should also cover transboundary harm from activities as
disparate as antitrust laws, monetary policies, newspapers, and even medical and biological
research. See Daniel Barstow Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commis-
sion's Study of "International Liability", 8o AM. J. INT'L L. 305, 323-24 (1986) ("Some members
argued-without providing any substantial justification- for the inclusion of 'restrictive
economic policies; 'monetary activities' and 'transboundary economic problems' (possibly
involving such subjects as antitrust policies, restrictive tariffs and import quotas, inflation-
ary and deflationary monetary policies, international lending policies, and tax laws affecting
transfer pricing or transnational capital flows). Others asserted that medical and biological
research and, more generally, 'economic, industrial and other activities' should be included.
Those and other claims prompted counter-arguments against coverage of transboundary
harm caused by newspaper articles, monetary devaluation and legitimate industrial or agri-
cultural competition.").
In the end, the ILC working group compromised: the decision was made that the
"rules to be drawn up should be of a general nature," even though many would relate to the
environment. See M.B. Akehurst, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 4 (1985) (noting that
while Quentin-Baxter himself preferred to limit the topic to the "field of the environment,"
the ILC as a whole explicitly rejected this approach).
This ILC project has been subject to sharp criticism. Brownlie calls the Commission
"fundamentally misconceived." IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAw OF NATIONS: STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY PART ISo (1983); see also JULio BARBOzA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABIL-
ITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2011) (explaining a serious attack made on the ILC's work in
1997 resulting from confusion that Barboza believes could have been, and in part was, ulti-
mately overcome). Most take a more moderate approach, recognizing that despite the prob-
lems encountered by the ILC in its efforts to develop a general regime of liability, the utility
and purpose of such a system is nontrivial. See, e.g., Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael
Reisman, The Quest for an International Liability Regime for the Protection of the Global Com-
mons, in INTERNATIONAL LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE 469, 488 (Karl Wellens ed., 1998)
("Our review of the successive efforts to deal with harm to the global commons thus indi-
cates a quest for an effective legal regime that has, as yet, had very limited success. . . . The
problems in constructing a viable regime for the protection of the global commons that in-
corporates a liability component are . .. formidable. But the consequences of not fashioning
such a regime -and doing it soon -may well constitute the most profound common threat
to humanity in the twenty-first century."); Montjoie, supra note loS, at 504.
is. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
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recognized the novelty of transboundary liability, particularly liability for mili-
tary-like actions outside of the context of war, but applied it nonetheless -even to
non-environmental damages. As it explained, the duty not to cause harm to
another state is expansive in contemporary society; in fact, it is a duty "even
more exacting in peace than in war.""' Scholars have suggested that Corfu
Channel recognized a "basic" transboundary duty upon states in international
law "not . .. to act as to injure the rights of other states."" 7 Indeed, building on
Corfu Channel, several states have successfully sought compensation for trans-
boundary harm from weapons tests.
B8. Liability and the Articles on State Responsibility
In light of this international practice, why is an act of transboundary harm
not "wrongful," and how is liability different from state responsibility? This
Section explains that when transboundary harm occurs as the result of an oth-
erwise lawful activity, a state may become liable to compensate the injured par-
ty for any harm caused. At that point, the state has not yet violated an obliga-
tion of international law; however, if the state fails to pay reparations, it
becomes responsible for violating the duty to prevent and redress transbounda-
ry harm.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 851 (6th ed. 2008). Shaw notes that the U.S. At-
torney General expressed support for this doctrine in 1895. Id. at 851 n.28.
118. For example, in 1955, the United States agreed to pay Japan for damages caused to individu-
als, fish populations, and the Japanese fish market due to nuclear tests carried out by the
United States on Enewetak Atoll. In 1964, the United States authorized $950,000 to be paid
in compensation to the inhabitants of Rongelap Atoll for similar damages, while in later
decades it prepared to settle Marshall Islands claims totaling over $ioo million. Elsewhere,
Canada reserved its right to compensation in the event of damage to the Pacific resulting
from nuclear tests on Amchitka Island in 1960, while Japan and New Zealand made a variety
of tort demands with respect to French nuclear testing throughout the decades. Similarly,
several European states reserved the right to bring claims against the Soviet Union for dam-
ages caused by Chernobyl. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶¶ 404-412.
Two other examples illustrate the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm
outside of the environmental context. In 1949, Austria made a formal protest to the Hungar-
ian Government not to install land mines near the Austrian border. When mines detonated
in Austria nearly two decades later, the Austrian government condemned Hungary's actions,
relying explicitly on the principle of "good-neighbourliness." Id. ¶ 419. Similarly, in 1968,
the Swiss government recognized liability to compensate Liechtenstein for damages suffered




First, we must distinguish between primary and secondary duties (also re-
ferred to as "rules" or "obligations") in international law."' Primary duties
govern state conduct. An example of a primary duty is the prohibition against
intervention. Secondary duties impose remedial obligations on states for acts
that violate a primary duty and are attributable to the state, taking into account
pertinent circumstances and defenses (such as duress and necessity). 120 An ex-
ample of a secondary duty is the requirement to make reparations. Primary du-
ties typically arise from treaties, customary international law, or general princi-
ples of international law, while secondary duties are often found in the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility.12 1 Therefore, to understand when a state has
committed a "wrongful act," one must first turn to the primary duty in ques-
tion and determine whether it has been breached.
iig. See Eric David, Primary and Secondary Rules, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note loo, at 27.
120. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, arts. 20-27, at 173-211. For further
discussion on primary and secondary duties, see Boyle, supra note 107, at to-11. The Com-
mentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility suggests that secondary duties concern
the following issues:
(a) The role of international law as distinct from the internal law of the State
concerned in characterizing conduct as unlawful; (b) Determining in what cir-
cumstances conduct is to be attributed to the State as a subject of international
law; (c) Specifying when and for what period of time there is or has been a
breach of an international obligation by a State; (d) Determining in what cir-
cumstances a State may be responsible for the conduct of another State . .. ; (e)
Defining the circumstances in which the wrongfulness of conduct under inter-
national law may be precluded; (f) Specifying the content of State responsibil-
ity, i.e. the new legal relations that arise from the commission by a State of an
internationally wrongful act, in terms of cessation of the wrongful act, and rep-
aration for any injury done; (g) Determining any procedural or substantive
preconditions for one State to invoke the responsibility of another State, and
the circumstances in which the right to invoke responsibility may be lost; (h)
Laying down the conditions under which a State may be entitled to respond to
a breach of an international obligation by taking countermeasures designed to
ensure the fulfilment of the obligations of the responsible State under these ar-
ticles.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at 6o.
121. See Boyle, supra note 107, at io; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at 123;
James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on State Responsibility, ¶ 325, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 4 / 507/Add3 (Aug. 4, 2000) ("The law of treaties is concerned essentially with the
content of primary rules and with the validity of attempts to alter them; the law of responsi-
bility takes as given the existence of the primary rules . . . and is concerned with the question
whether conduct inconsistent with those rules can be excused and, if not, what the conse-
quences of such conduct are.").
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Liability differs from the traditional concept of responsibility. According to
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility - the primary restatement of the doc-
trine of state responsibility, prepared by the ILC -a state is responsible for an
act (or omission) when the act is attributable to the state and wrongful under
international law. An act is wrongful under international law when it is a viola-
tion of a state's primary duty to another state. 122 In contrast, liability does not
result from a wrongful act per se1 23 but instead focuses on compensation for
harms. 124 Under this second approach, a state can be liable for an act of trans-
boundary harm, even if the activities giving rise to the harm were not in them-
selves breaches of international law.125
Within this two-tiered system of state responsibility, the duty to prevent
and redress transboundary harm is unusual, because it appears to contain as-
pects of both a primary and a secondary duty. As a primary duty, it incorpo-
122. SHAw, supra note 117, at 782.
123. An American member present at the ILC's 25th Session is said to have initially made the dis-
tinction between the terms "liability" and "responsibility." The record reflects that he advo-
cated: "[T]he term 'responsibility' should be used only in connexion [sic] with internation-
ally wrongful acts and that, with reference to the possible injurious consequences arising out
of the performance of certain lawful activities, the . . . term 'liability' should be used." Draft
Rep. of the Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-Fifih Session, [1973] 1 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n
210, 211, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973.
124. The ILC has stressed the importance of harm to liability, as opposed to responsibility. See
State Responsibility, [1974] 1 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n 5, 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974
("In the case of wrongful activities, damage was often an important element, but it was not
absolutely necessary as a basis for international responsibility. On the other hand, damage
was an indispensable element for establishing liability for lawful, but injurious activities.").
A number of commentators, including the ILC, refer to liability for transboundary harm as
thus liability sine delicto, that is, liability "which does not have its origin in an internationally
wrongful act." See RENt LEFEBER, TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCE AND
THE ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY 15, 198-202 (1996).
125. Several of the handful who have examined the topic of liability in international law begin by
noting how much "confusion" there is about the subject. See, e.g., Alan Boyle, Liability for In-
jurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATION-
AL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note ioo, 95, 95-104 (noting the confusion surrounding how the
ILC working group on injurious consequences would develop the topic and the variety of
intellectual difficulties that the ILC faced); N.L.J.T. Horbach, The Confusion About State Re-
sponsibility and International Liability, 4 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 47 (1991) (recognizing the confu-
sion between state responsibility and international liability); Sompong Sucharitkul, State
Responsibility and International Liability Under International Law, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 821 (1996) (same); see also Rep. of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Thirty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/4o/1o, reprinted in [1985] 2 Y.B. Int'l Law Comm'n
pt. 2, at 19-27 (discussing the various intellectual challenges and disagreements encountered
by the ILC in its work on liability). There is still confusion left about the state of liability in
international law.
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rates the standards of care expected of states to fulfill the duty. 12 6 Yet like a sec-
ondary duty, it requires states to provide remedies when harms occur.127 This
combination of duties comprises "liability" in international law.128 Liability is
thus a "continuum of prevention and reparation" resulting from the underlying
duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm.12 9
These distinctions have caused much confusion over the years, as scholars
have debated whether transboundary harms automatically give rise to state re-
sponsibility instead of liability. As ICJ Judge Higgins explains, "Cases like Trail
Smelter-which we had all in our youth thought [had] something to do with
international responsibility for harm to your neighbour (and a clear example of
the absence of need of malice, or culpa)," are instead "not now questions of state
responsibility but are put into another category" -what today is called interna-
tional liability."'o
Though distinct from responsibility, liability remains connected to respon-
sibility in an important way. While causing transboundary harm is not prohib-
ited by international law, "responsibility attach[es] for harm, [when] coupled
with a [state's] failure to meet the required standard of care."' As Judge Hig-
gins explains, "[F] ailure to meet [the applicable] standard of care, with result-
126. The ILC conceives of prevention as: (i) performing proper risk assessments, (2) preventing
harm or minimizing the risk thereof, and (3) giving notice and technical information con-
cerning risk to the country affected. See Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm, supra note
109, at 390, 402, 4o6:
127. See Boyle, supra note 107, at lo, 17. Boyle notes that within the international liability regime,
the ILC has recognized that an "injured State can order the other to: (1) discontinue the act;
(2) apply national legal remedies; (3) re-establish the situation existing before the act or, to
the extent that this is impossible, pay corresponding compensation; (4) provide guarantees
against repetition." Id. at 17. However, some have disagreed, suggesting that only compensa-
tion can be requested. See id. at 17-18; see also Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion,
Case No. 17, Order of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 1o, 49 (advising, with regard to international
seabed activity, that sponsoring States are required to "establish procedures, and, if neces-
sary, substantive rules governing claims for damages before its domestic courts").
128. Outside of customary international law and general principles of international law, several
treaties have created forms of liability in international law. See infra text accompanying note
143.
129. Liability for Injurious Consequences, supra note 1o6, ¶ 40. Others have called this same under-
lying duty a "compound primary obligation." Magraw, supra note 114, at 311.
130. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 164 (1995).
131. Id. at 165.
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ant harm -that is the internationally wrongful act, for which state responsibil-
ity attaches."1 3 2
Cases like Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel can be seen as imposing state re-
sponsibility after the state that caused transboundary harm failed to redress the
situation. These cases typically involve states that failed to terminate and com-
pensate for activities resulting in cross-border harm even after having received
notice. Moreover, these cases involve transboundary harms resulting from ac-
tivities that are not themselves unlawful under international law. Therefore,
although some see Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel as establishing the idea that
transboundary harm is wrongful under international law,"' these cases are
better understood as invoking the concept of wrongfulness for transboundary
harm only after the initial harms are inadequately redressed.
Under customary international law, states have long refrained from judging
certain kinds of cross-border damages as wrongful in and of themselves -
provided that the state causing the damage takes remedial action to compensate
for the damage.' 34 Under this liability regime, the state causing the trans-
boundary harm must fail to provide redress before the injured state can invoke
state responsibility. Until this point, the transboundary harm is not yet a
"wrongful act",and the injured state cannot engage in countermeasures. This
conception of liability helps prevent routine cross-border harms, especially un-
intentional harms, from escalating within the international legal system.
C. Dual Liability Standards
Even once we recognize that international law can impose liability for
transboundary harms, we must decide what standard of care should be used to
determine whether a state is liable. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility de-
liberately do not provide guidance as to the appropriate standard of care in any
particular context. 135 Instead, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility defer to
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 163-64. As Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro explain, in the pre-contemporary order,
this practice played out clearly not via the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which prohibit
a recourse to force as a means of secondary enforcement in the contemporary era, but indeed
via the secondary enforcement tool of war: "[States] had to make a claim regarding a
wrong, offer an opportunity for peaceful redress, explain to the world why the wrong had
not [been] addressed, and then go to war." See HATHAWAY & SHAPiRo, supra note 102, at 9.
135. JAMES CRAwFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL ILAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 13-14 (2002) ("[T]he essential point is




primary rules to determine whether "some degree of fault, culpability, negli-
gence or want of due diligence" applies in assessing state conduct.13 6 This is a
sensible approach because, as Judge Higgins suggests,
[t] he standard by which the duty of care in regard to an obligation is to
be tested is determined by reference to the particular requirements of that
obligation. The law of state responsibility does not tell us the answer to
this: we can say only that a state is responsible for failing to take, either
generally or with respect to the conduct of individuals, duly diligent
care or care to such other standard as the particular obligation re-
quires.
While some suggest that the Draft Articles on State Responsibility impose
negligence as a default standard of care when the primary rule is unclear about
ing from "due diligence" to strict liability .... By referring these issues to the interpretation
and application of the primary rule, the Draft Articles took an essentially neutral position,
neither requiring nor excluding these elements in any given case. This was a more subtle
approach, more appropriate to a general set of articles dealing with all international obliga-
tions....").
136. Id. at 82. Some argue that in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, the ICJ
settled the question of what the proper standard of liability was when it stated the follow-
ing: "A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved;
responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to pre-
vent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing
the genocide." Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 5 430 (Feb. 26).
However, in that case, it is clear that the ICJ did not set out a universal standard of due dili-
gence, but instead looked to "the obligation in question" (the relevant primary duty, which
was a duty to prevent genocide). In doing so, the ICJ determined that the duty to prevent
genocide was "one of conduct and not one of result," and thus that a standard of due dili-
gence was applicable. Id.
137. HIGGINS, supra note 130, at 157; see also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18,
at 31 ("The emphasis is on the secondary rules of State responsibility; that is to say, the gen-
eral conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for wrong-
ful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. The articles do
not attempt to define the content of the international obligations, the breach of which gives
rise to responsibility. This is the function of the primary rules, whose codification would in-
volve restating most of substantive customary and conventional international law."); R.
DOAK BISHOP, JAMES E. CRAWFORD & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT Dis-
PUTES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 576 (2d ed. 2014) ("Although international re-
sponsibility is sometimes said to be based on the principle of 'objective responsibility,' there
is no general rule in the matter: some obligations are obligations of due diligence, others
may entail a stricter standard.").
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the applicable standard of care," many primary duties require stricter or more
lenient standards of care.'
The ILC suggests that the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm
is one such primary duty-in certain circumstances, it may impose strict or ab-
solute liability. Strict liability is liability without fault, meaning that liability is
imposed on the actor regardless of whether reasonable care was exercised.140
While similar, absolute liability imposes liability regardless of the actor's' poten-
tial defenses or intent.141
As Justice Blackburn explained in Rylands v. Fletcher, industrial society has
recognized the need for strict liability for "anything likely to do mischief if it es-
capes" and "which [the owner] knows will be mischievous if it gets on to his
neighbor's [property]. 4 2 Based on this reasoning, domestic jurisdictions
throughout the world, as well as international treaties, recognize liability with-
out "fault" for "abnormally dangerous" or "ultra-hazardous" activities, often in
the areas of nuclear energy, transportation of hazardous chemicals, environ-
mental damage, pollution, oil spills, train wrecks, space objects, and mining. 43
Some have even suggested that absolute liability might apply beyond this
practice to inherently hazardous activities. For example, Canada referenced ab-
solute liability as a "general principle" of international law in its claim against
the Soviet Union for damages caused by the "Cosmos 954" satellite.1 44 Similar-
138. See Sucharitkul, supra note 125, at 835-39. Nevertheless, Malcolm Shaw has contended that
the majority of academic opinions tend toward an understanding of strict liability and the
objective theory for state responsibility. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 698 (5 th
ed. 2003).
139. See, e.g., Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2398, 961 U.N.T.S 187; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265; Convention on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 263.
140. See JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 451 (8th ed. 2012).
141. See id. Absolute liability is taken to mean full liability, or in the words of Judge Higgins, lia-
bility "by reference to events, with culpa as much an irrelevance as the due-diligence test.'
HIGGINS, supra note 130, at 161. Absolute liability is used over the term "strict liability" to
avoid confusion from the fact that the strict liability is typically only referenced in the con-
text of negligence torts.
142. Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] LRE & I. App. 330, 339-40 (HL).
143. ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 21; see, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700; United Na-
tions Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels, Oct. 10, 1989, U.N. Doc.
ECE/TRANS/79; see also supra note 139 (listing additional treaties).
144. ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 401.
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ly, the ILC has suggested that in some areas, states have been held liable for
harms even when they took care to prevent them.14 5 Malcolm Shaw explains
that the key benefit of the absolute liability approach is that it "mov[es] the
burden of proof and shift[s] the loss clearly from the victim to the state," as a
plaintiff need not show that a state causing harm actually acted imprudently
but only that harms emanated from its activities or territory.14 6
Nevertheless, the ILC acknowledges that most domestic legal systems have
increasingly imported the concept of negligence into nuisance doctrine, and
therefore that the duty to prevent transboundary harm is better seen as impos-
ing a negligence standard.' *' Negligence is defined as failure to behave with the
level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised under the circum-
stances.14 8 The concept of negligence finds its way into international liability in
the form of the standard of due diligence, which requires states to act with care
that "is generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to the degree
of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance."14 9 In the Pulp Mills
case, the ICJ referred to the PCIJ's judgment in Corfu Channel' and recog-
nized "an obligation [on states] to act with due diligence in respect of all activi-
ties which take place under the jurisdiction and control of each party."s1 The
court further explained due diligence as
an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules
and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement
and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and pri-
145. The ILC has at points noted that even if the acting state observes its duties to take preven-
tive measures, it should nonetheless be held answerable for damage, given that the duty not
to cause damage is un-conditional. See XUE, supra note 24, at 14.
146. SHAw, supra note 117, at 888.
147. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶¶ 65-79.
148. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 140, at 159.
149. SHAw, supra note 117, at 861. See generally ILA Study Grp. on Due Diligence in Int'l Law,
First Report, INT'L L. Ass'N (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid
/8AC 4 DFAl-4 AB6- 4 687-A265FF9Co37A699 [http://perma.cc/786K-TDCU] (considering
whether there is agreement between the distinctive areas of international law in which the
concept of due diligence is applied). Due diligence was first recognized in the Alabama arbi-
tration of 1872 between the United States and the United Kingdom over obligations under
the law of neutrality. See Ala. Claims Arbitration, (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 129
(1872). Due diligence also evolved out of the customary international duty on states to pro-
tect aliens. See ILA Study Grp. on Due Diligence in Int'l Law, supra, at 2.
150. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 24 (Apr. 9).
151. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 197 (Apr. 20).
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vate operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such
operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party.152
Yet it remains unclear which of these two standards is most appropriate for
the duty to prevent transboundary harm. Negligence has been found alternat-
ingly essential and irrelevant to liability for transboundary harm in different
cases.' There is also extensive disagreement over how to interpret the few
cases that have dealt explicitly with transboundary liability. For instance, some
observe that because the United States did not "affirmatively prove the defend-
ant's negligence or wilful default" in Trail Smelter, strict liability effectively ap-
plied.s' Others make a similar argument with respect to the Lake Ontario
Claims Tribunal, arguing that the Tribunal made no express finding of fault or
negligence for the damages that resulted from extensive flooding in connection
with.a Canadian-built dam.1 5 5
Disagreement also persists over the standard applied by the ICJ in Corfu
Channel. The most persuasive views, supported by the dissents of Judges
Badawi Pasha and Winiarski, suggest that Corfu Channel stands for strict liabil-
ity in certain situations, given that the breach of the duty to prevent trans-
boundary harm was recognized without proof of negligence. 1 6 The dissenting
judges argued that Albania had neither breached any duty of diligence nor act-
ed with willful default, and instead that the court had applied a higher stand-
ard, what they called "absolute" liability.s'
A way out of this dissensus can be found in Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France).ss In the ICJ hearings in the case, Australia argued that there is a
152. Id. For instance, in the environmental context, due diligence has since become firmly estab-
lished as a requirement on states to undertake environmental impact assessments prior to
activities likely to give rise to significant harm, as well to notify and consult parties likely to
be affected by that harm and offer technical assistance in the case that harm does occur. See,
e.g., Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm, supra note 109, art. 8, at 406-09 (specifying
that states should notify and consult other states if there is a risk that one of their activities
may cause harm and also obliging states to provide reparation, consequential on the causa-
tion of harm itself); Boyle, supra note 107, at 22.
153. The ILC has noted as much in its survey of state practice on liability. See ILC Survey, supra
note 84, ¶ 55.
154. Id. 5 229.
155. See id. ¶¶ 415-16.
156. See id. ¶¶ 228-29.
157. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 51 (Apr. 9) (Winiarski, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 66-67 (Badawi Pasha, J., dissenting); ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 229.
158. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J. 99 (June 22). The ICJ did not rule on the




growing trend toward a due diligence standard for activities holding societal
value,159 but strict liability for those imposing unreasonable risks without clear
benefits. While "every transmission by natural causes of chemical or other mat-
ter from one State into another State's territory, air space or territorial sea au-
tomatically created a legal cause of action in international law without the need
to establish anything more," contemporary state practice has in fact "modified
the application of this principle in respect of the interdependence of territo-
ries." 6 o Therefore, in Australia's view, liability standards should be more leni-
ent when the activities causing harm "are generally regarded as natural uses of
territory in a contemporary society and ... while perhaps producing some in-
convenience, they have a community benefit."16 1 The ICJ seemed to adopt this
approach in Nuclear Tests when it found France's activities to have "no compen-
sating benefit to justify New Zealand's exposure to such harm."'6 2
Therefore, we can reconcile these competing standards by recognizing that
while private nuisance has long looked favorably upon absolute liability for
is. Article to of the ILC's Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm similarly supports an "equitable
balance of interests" based in part upon "importance of the activity, taking into account its
overall advantages of a social, economic and technical character . .. in relation to the poten-
tial harm" when consulting potentially harmed states about preventative measures. Draft Ar-
ticles on Transboundary Harm, supra note 109, art. to, at 412. Boyle notes that one of the
three main points driving the work of the ILC on liability was thus the idea that "every State
must have the maximum freedom of action within its territory compatible with respect for
the sovereign equality of other States." Boyle, supra note 107, at 6.
160. ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 234; see also Nuclear Tests, 1973 I.C.J. at 104.
161. ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 234; see also SHAw, supra note 117, at 861 (noting that the ILC
Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm specify in Article to that the Articles strive for an "equi-
table balance of interests" and that in applying liability, the Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm seek to account for the "the importance of the activity [causing harm]" for the state
where the activity is taking place in relation to the states that are likely to be affected, as well
as the "means of preventing or minimising such risk").
162. ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶¶ 235-37. The ILC has made similar references to the fact that
some activities giving rise to transboundary harm are "not always possible to prohibit or
avoid" because they are "beneficial to society in general." Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao (Spe-
cial Rapporteur), Third Rep. on the Legal Regime for the Allocation of Loss in Case of Trans-
boundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, ¶ 36(3), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/54o (May 15,
2004). Because of this, the ILC has noted that in many jurisdictions,
Strict liability . .. [for] inherently dangerous or hazardous activities . . . is argu-
ably a general principle of international law, or in any case could be considered
as a measure of progressive development of international law. In the case of ac-
tivities which are not dangerous but still carry the risk of causing significant
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otherwise "abnormal" activities that do not benefit the community, due dili-
gence has been more accepted for activities that cause harm but are thought to
promote a common good. A dual approach of this sort recognizes that not all
transboundary harms exist in the same light, particularly if imposing absolute
liability would result in onerous burdens or infringements on other important
principles, such as privacy and open internet access. This approach is particu-
larly apt for the cyber context, as discussed next.
FIGURE 2.
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Ill. APPLYING LIABILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY HARM TO LOW-
INTENSITY STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ATTACKS
"[W]e are confident the North Korean government is responsible for
this destructive attack . . .. If [they want] to help, they can admit their
culpability and compensate Sony for the damages this attack caused."
-Mark Stroh, National Security Council Spokesman'16
This Part applies the concept of liability to low-intensity state-sponsored
cyber attacks and discusses how the appropriate standard of care should de-
pend on whether a cyber attack is attributable to a state or non-state actor.
A. Contemporary Approaches and Cyber: An Absurd Result?1 6 1
Recent scholarship has begun to import features of the duty to prevent
transboundary harm into the cyber context. 165 Most notably, this concept sur-
faces in the Tallinn Manual.166 Some have suggested that states have a "due dil-
163. Julie Makinen, North Korea Decries U.S. Allegations on Sony Hack; U.S. Turns to China, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-proposes
-joint-investigation-into-sony-hack-20141220-story.html [http://perma.cc/8VPD-JSCT].
164. This is a term adopted from treaty interpretation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("Recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation... when the interpretation according to article 31 ... [l]eads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.").
165. See Oren Gross, Cyber Responsibility To Protect: Legal Obligations of States Directly Affected by
Cyber-Incidents, 48 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (2015); Jason Healey & Hannah Pitts, Applying In-
ternational Environmental Legal Norms to Cyber Statecraft, 8 I/S 356 (2012); Eric Talbot Jensen,
Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead, 5o TEX. INT'L L.J. 275 (2015); Thilo Marauhn, Customary
Rules of International Environmental Law - Can They Provide Guidance for Developing a Peace-
time Regime for Cyberspace?, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE, su-
pra note 46; Daniel Ortner, Cybercrime and Punishment: The Russian Mafia and Russian Re-
sponsibility To Exercise Due Diligence To Prevent Trans-boundary Cybercrime, 2015 BYU L. REV.
177; Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J. F. 68 (2015);
Ziolkowski, supra note 46; Jan E. Messerschmidt, Note, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory
Hacking by Non-State Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275 (2013).
166. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, at 26 ("A State shall not knowingly allow the cyber
infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to be used
for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other states."); see also U.N. Secretary-General,
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, U.N. Doc. A/70/172 (July 22, 2015) (transmitting member states' views of interna-
tional security in the cyber context); Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Infor-
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igence obligation with respect to both government and private cyber infrastruc-
ture on, and cyber activities emanating from, their territory." 167 In this framing,
a state that fails to meet this due diligence standard of care is held responsible
under international law and may be subject to countermeasures. 6 '
Beginning with the issue of transboundary harm, the Tallinn Manual sug-
gests that due diligence is either itself a primary obligation in international law,
or else a standard of care owed with respect to the principle of territorial sover-
eignty. 169 Michael Schmitt is equally vague; for him, due diligence is a "princi-
ple" of international law on its own but at the same time, one that "derives
from the principle of sovereignty.""7 o
To consider due diligence to be a primary obligation is problematic. Due
diligence appears to exist not as an independent obligation within customary
international law, giving rise to state responsibility, but instead as a standard of
care owed with respect to certain primary duties in international law."7 But the
second option -deriving a due diligence standard from the principle of sover-
eignty -may also present challenges, particularly in the cyber context. For one,
as Part I discussed, considerable issues arise in attempting to apply the notion
of sovereignty to cyberspace. Not only is it difficult to determine the extent of a
state's sovereign territorial rights in the internet, but there are also significant
arguments against an absolute right of states to sovereignty in the first place.
Moreover, critics point to hundreds of years of state practice suggesting that
mation and Telecommunications in the Context of Information Security, [ 23, U.N. Doc.
A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) ("States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by
non-State actors for unlawful use of [information and computer technologies].").
167. Schmitt, supra note 165, at 70.
168. See id. at 70; Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: AJus-
tification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty To Prevent, 201
MIL. L. REv. 1, 14 (2009).
169. See TAILINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, at 26-29.
170. See Schmitt, supra note 165, at 71.
171. For instance, in the Alabama arbitration, the foundational case affirming the concept of due
diligence in international law, the Law of Neutrality provided the source of the due diligence
standard breached by the United Kingdom in permitting ships to be built for the war effort
on its territory. However, due diligence did not exist as a discrete requirement on states and
indeed was simply a required standard of care when abiding by the Law of Neutrality. See
Ala. Claims Arbitration (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 129 (1872). In addition, the ap-
plicability of the Alabama arbitration to any general obligation of due diligence is limited
given that the Alabama arbitration was carried out pursuant to the Treaty of Washington of
1871, which itself provided for three "rules," two of which called for "due diligence" as the
standard for assessing each state's conduct. See generally Treaty of Washington, Gr. Brit.-
U.S., May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863.
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interferences below a certain level of coercion are tolerated -or at least not
clearly unlawful - as in the case of espionage. 172
Yet even if we were to accept that a due diligence obligation attached to the
principle of sovereignty, this approach would create significant conflicts with
other legal constructs. For example, this approach would render the concept of
intervention redundant; indeed, non-intervention might not make sense at all.
After all, why would the prohibition on intervention be limited to coercive in-
trusions on a state's sovereign affairs if there already exists a duty of due dili-
gence upon states to avoid all intrusions?
Though these differences might seem trivial, the consequences are not, es-
pecially in the context of low-intensity cyber attacks. For example, it is likely
that states possess a due diligence obligation to prevent cyber attacks that con-
stitute a use of force or intervention, since these are two categories where the
primary duties prohibiting these acts may expressly incorporate a standard of
due diligence.17 ' However, it is less certain that due diligence attaches for cyber
attacks below this level. For these attacks, one must turn to the relevant prima-
ry duty. In the case of low-intensity cyber attacks, this is the duty to prevent
and redress transboundary harm. If due diligence is the appropriate standard
by which to judge state conduct at the level of low-intensity cyber attacks, then
such an approach would have to recognize the underlying duty to prevent
transboundary harm -given that this is the only primary duty that governs the
low-intensity space. 17
172. See supra Section I.B.
173. See Sucharitkul, supra note 125, at 838. Still, uncertainty about this question persists.
174. It is unclear the extent to which the Tallinn Manual and Schmitt imply that due diligence
applies in the low-intensity cyber context; however, several others offered such an argu-
ment. See, e.g., Karine Bannelier-Christakis, Cyber Diligence: A Low-Intensity Due Diligence
Principle for Low-Intensity Cyberspace?, 14 BALTIC Y.B. INT'L L. 23 (2014); Scott J. Shackelford
et al., Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public
and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2016). In fact, one could argue that Schmitt and the
Tallinn Manual may have even implicitly invoked the concept of transboundary harm, per-
haps out of concern that invoking sovereignty in too strict a sense might be problematic.
After all, they seem to see due diligence as applying not to all intrusions into a state's sover-
eign territory, but instead to intrusions "inflict[ing] serious damage" or causing "adverse
effects." TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, cmt. 3, at 26; Schmitt, supra note 165, at 75.
This suggests that most of the substance in the approach taken by Schmitt and the Tallinn
Manual to due diligence may actually come through the words "damage," "effect," or "inju-
ry" -words that resonate strongly with the concepts explored by the ILC in its work on
transboundary liability, and not necessarily with the concept of "sovereignty." That is, an in-
vocation of the right to sovereignty alone, as compared to an invocation of transboundary
harm, would struggle to draw a line between any intrusion and intrusions causing "serious
damage."
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This leads us to the next set of questions: how far liability for the duty to
prevent transboundary harm extends and what standard of care it calls for. De-
spite relying on Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel, both Schmitt and the Tallinn
Manual avoid addressing this set of questions.17 1
By only referencing due diligence, Schmitt and the Tallinn Manual avoid
addressing whether states have an obligation not to launch cyber attacks out-
side of the context of non-intervention and use of force. When the duty is
framed just in terms of due diligence, states appear to have only a positive duty
to thwart other actors from using state territory to launch attacks. As the Tal-
linn Manual indicates, a state may not "allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other States," 6 and as such, "[s]tates are re-
quired under international law to take appropriate steps to protect those
rights."17 7 The Tallinn Manual goes so far as to suggest that due diligence ap-
plies to cyber attacks "launched from cyber infrastructure that is under the ex-
clusive control of a government."17 8
Stepping back, these statements seem to be a relatively backwards way of
getting at a more important idea: whether states owe not just positive duties to
prevent attacks, but also negative duties to refrain from them. International law
typically imposes a negative duty not to act in a certain way-such as a duty not
to launch a cyber attack - before it imposes related positive duties to act - such
as a duty to prevent others from launching a cyber attack. Accordingly, states
are usually held responsible after violating not just positive duties but also neg-
ative duties. 179
175. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, cmt. 3, at 26 (discussing Corfu Channel); Schmitt,
supra note 165, at 72 (discussing Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel).
176. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, cmt. 3, at 26 (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9)).
177. Id.
178. Id. cmt. 8, at 27-28.
179. For example, in human rights law, "first generation" human rights obligations are under-
stood as obligations on states to refrain from certain behaviors. "Second generation" obliga-
tions include economic and social rights, which are often provided by the state. See CHRIS-
TIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 137-39 (3d ed. 2014).
Invoking liability for transboundary harm also helps resolve confusions that arise in
the 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Despite
commenting at length on the importance of the principle of sovereignty in cyberspace, this
report does not provide a clear rule against states launching cyber attacks, though it recom-
mends that "[s]tates should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally
wrongful acts." Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Infor-
mation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc.
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B. Applicability to Low-Intensity State-Sponsored CyberAttacks
I contend that (1) the relevant duty for low-intensity cyber attacks is the
duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm and (2) this duty applies to all
transboundary cyber harms above a minimum level of tolerance - including
those that are intentionally caused by states. I propose associating the duty to
prevent and redress transboundary harm with two standards of liability: abso-
lute liability for attacks attributable to a state and due diligence for attacks by
actors operating within a state's boundaries." This dual-standard approach
recognizes that positive and negative duties impose different burdens on states.
While it is considerably more difficult for states to prevent non-state actors
from launching an attack, states clearly have the ability not to launch attacks in
the first place.
State-sponsored cyber attacks appear to meet the description of activities
traditionally governed by absolute liability. Even the best-designed attacks car-
ry a risk of damage to unintended parties, given the interconnectivity of the in-
ternet.'"' This militates in favor of considering state-sponsored cyber attacks to
be essentially "abnormally" dangerous or "ultra-hazardous" activity for the
purposes of liability.
A/70/174 (2015) (emphasis added). This formulation, like the due diligence formulations
above, leaves unclear not only what such "internationally wrongful acts" might be, but also
what duties states owe with respect to low-intensity cyber attacks in the first place.
180. "Within a state's boundaries" is taken broadly to apply to all non-state activities giving rise
to cross-border harm, regardless of whether actors causing harm were physically present or
acted via infrastructure located in a given state.
181. See McKay et al., supra note 38. See generally David Raymond et al., A Control Measure
Framework To Limit Collateral Damage and Propagation of Cyber Weapons, NATO COOPERA-
TIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE (2013), http://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2013/proceedings
/dir2s6_raymond.pdf [http://perma.cc/V8EE-4GRJ] (suggesting measures needed to pre-
vent cyber weapons from causing indiscriminate harm). State-sponsored attacks may be
more sophisticated than average non-state hacks, making them prone to significant destruc-
tion. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Suite of Sophisticated Nation-State Attack Tools Found with Connec-
tion to Stuxnet, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/o2/kapersky
-discovers-equation-group [http://perma.cc/CM86-PHHW].
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FIGURE 3.
TWO STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR LOW-INTENSITY CYBER ATTACKS
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The intentional nature of state-sponsored attacks supports absolute liabil-
ity as the applicable standard of care, at least when attribution is possible. Typi-
cally, actors who commit intentional torts are liable for all directly consequent
harms, regardless of the degree of care exercised or the extent to which the sub-
sequent harms were foreseeable or intended.1' For example, if a defendant in-
tends to hit A and unintentionally hits B as well, the defendant is liable for
damages caused to both A and B, even if the defendant was theoretically "dili-
gent" in his or her attempt to hit A and not B. 183 This doctrine, known as the
principle of transferred intent, imposes what amounts to absolute liability for
182. Lea Brilmayer explains, "Under international law, as in domestic law, foreseeability and
proximate cause have been closely linked for both conceptual and practical reasons. Foresee-
ability is important as a convenient shorthand for the natural or probable consequences of
any act." Lea Brilmayer, Ownership or Use? Civilian Property Interests in International Humani-
tarian Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 413, 442 (2008) Therefore, "[w]here harm is intentional, it is
necessarily reasonably foreseeable, and foreseeability is generally sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment of proximate cause'" Id. (emphasis added). The UN Compensation Commission has uti-
lized this approach of substituting foreseeability for proximate cause. See Arthur W. Rovine
& Grant Hanessian, Toward a Foreseeability Approach to Causation Questions at the United Na-
tions Compensation Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 235
- (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995).
183. This idea of absolute liability for intentional torts in international law finds support in the
practice of the UN Compensation Commission. Though the Commission was only entitled
under UN Security Council Resolution 687 to hold Iraq liable for "direct loss, damage ... or
injury," a Commission panel concluded that harms resulting from environmental pollution
related to the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells were compensable. The panel found these harms
sufficiently foreseeable and therefore proximate to merit compensation, in part because the
burning of these fields was intentional. See Brilmayer, supra note 182, at 442. In addition, the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility suggest that the intentional or deliberate nature of
wrongful state actions can overcome the requirements of proximate cause when calculating
reparations. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, art. 31, cmt. lo, at 227-
28 (emphasis added) ("[C]ausality in fact is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
reparation. There is a further element, associated with the exclusion of injury that is too
'remote' or 'consequential' to be the subject of reparation. In some cases, the criterion of 'di-
rectness' may be used, in others 'foreseeability' or 'proximity.' But other factors may also be
relevant: for example, whether State organs deliberately caused the harm in question, or
whether the harm caused was within the ambit of the rule which was breached, having re-
gard to the purpose of that rule. In other words, the requirement of a causal link is not nec-
essarily the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation."). In domestic
law, the Third Restatement of Torts also provides for a broader scope of liability, through
more expansive "proximate cause" limits, when an actor commits an intentional tort. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110, cmt. a (AM. LAw
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
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intentional torts so as to discourage tortious conduct and to make whole each
impacted party.1 84
By contrast, where attribution to a state is impossible, but attribution to
private entities operating within a state's territory or via infrastructure located
in a state is possible, an attack should only give rise to liability if the state failed
to act diligently in preventing it. That is, the applicable standard of care im-
posed upon states in these cases should be due diligence. This obligation en-
courages states to take measures to prevent cyber criminals from operating
within their territory. It also decreases the likelihood that states will escape lia-
bility for attacks that they launch but that are difficult to attribute to them,
since due diligence will serve as the default standard of care. This approach is
similar to the one proposed by Schmitt and the Tallinn Manual:
[T]he due diligence principle... provide[s] grounds for a response
when a state is suspected of engaging in the hostile cyber activities, but
insufficient evidence exists to satisfy the level of certainty necessary for
legal attribution. In other words, even where there is no smoking gun
that would legally justify treating the cyber operations as those of the
state, the state could be treated as having failed its due diligence obliga-
tion, and the principle would permit countermeasures on that basis.'-
Yet in sharp contrast to the approach taken by the Tallinn Manual, a breach
of the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm should not give rise to
state responsibility directly, but instead should result first in liability- that is, a
requirement that the state compensate for the damages it caused. Liability, as
opposed to responsibility, is particularly appropriate given the immense chal-
lenges of adequately assessing state actions,1s6 as discussed in the next Part.
This approach would also require states not simply to fire back countermeas-
ures, but indeed to seek compensation through a liability claim before resorting
to a claim that the attacking state should be held responsible.
184. One of the three driving points of the ILC's work on liability was the understanding that "an
innocent victim should not be left to bear his loss or injury." Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter
(Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out ofActs Not Prohibited by International Law, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4 /36o (June 23, 1982).
185. Schmitt, supra note 165, at 8o. Rule 5 of the Tallinn Manual says that a state should not
knowingly allow its infrastructure to be used to harm other states; the commentary to Rule 5
indicates that a state can violate Rule 5 absent a full finding of attribution. See TALUINN
MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, cmt. 3, at 26.
186. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, 5 23 (noting the difficulty of assessing state conduct as "neg-
ligent").
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In sum, the purpose of imposing either absolute liability or the due dili-
gence standard of care should be to compel states to compensate for the dam-
ages caused by cyber attacks, as well as the damages caused by their inadequate
monitoring and security of their domestic systems.
C. Complications of a Liability System
This Section considers potential issues with applying liability for trans-
boundary harms to low-intensity cyber attacks, including whether the inten-
tional nature of low-intensity cyber attacks prevents an application of liability,
what level of damages can give rise to liability, and the mechanisms that might
be invoked to impose liability.
1. The Issue of Intent
One might suggest that the duty to prevent and redress transboundary
harm should turn on the issue of whether the state intended to cause the harm,
but international law and precedent counsel otherwise. International tribunals
have not held that intent precludes liability for the duty to prevent and redress
transboundary harm.
For example, international law is often reluctant to pass judgment on the
"mindset" of a state, particularly given uncertainty as to determining the intent
of an expansive state apparatus." in response to the puzzle of determining a
state's "intent," effects-based assessments have gained prominence over the
years. Under an effects-based assessment, a state may incur responsibility even
when it unwittingly engages in certain prohibited or harmful activities." The
187. In fact, the Drafi Articles on State Responsibility explain that neither fault nor intention is nec-
essary to find state responsibility. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18,
art. 2, cmt. io, at 73 ("[One] ... question is whether fault constitutes a necessary element of
the internationally wrongful act of a State. This is certainly not the case if by 'fault' one un-
derstands the existence, for example, of an intention to harm. In the absence of any specific
requirement of a mental element in terms of the primary obligation, it is only the act of a
State that matters, independently of any intention."). As it seems that the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility do not require intent to find that state responsibility inheres, it is hard to
explain (even at a theoretical level) why a finding of intent to harm would preclude applica-
tion of international liability.
i88. For example, in both the Nicaragua and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo cases,
the "motive of the supporting State" in providing support to third parties was found to be
"of little consequence;' to a determination that the state had engaged in unlawful action.
Watts, supra note 17, at 268-69; see also GRAY, supra note 43, at 79; HIGGINS, supra note 130,
at 146-68.
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UN International Group of Governmental Experts adopted such an "objective"
approach for cyberspace, defining a cyber "armed attack" by the size and scale
of damages involved, without reference to the state's "intent."18 9
If intent is not necessary in these cases, it would be unreasonable to require
intent in the low-intensity cyber realm in order to hold a state liable for trans-
boundary harm. After all, liability is less serious than responsibility, given that
an injured state would make a liability claim against the attacking state before
asserting that the attacking state should be held responsible,9 o and a liability
claim does not permit injured states to take advantage of countermeasures, as
responsibility frequently does.1 '
Perhaps the strongest argument for deeming intent irrelevant comes from
the fact that a low-intensity attack is a per se negligent act, given the broader
duty on states to prevent and redress transboundary harm. For example, the
ILC conceives of the duty as encompassing a duty not only to perform risk as-
sessments and to minimize risks of harm in prospective activities, but also to
give notice and stop harm once the state becomes aware of it.1 92 In this sense,
once a state knows it is causing harm-even if it did not realize that its cross-
border actions would do so at the outset-it has a duty to stop and redress the
situation and to compensate injured parties for any harms caused.
International law has been quick to apply liability for "non-accidental"
torts - that is, torts that are caused despite a state's awareness of harmful effects
mounting over time. 193 In some senses, low-intensity state-sponsored cyber at-
tacks resemble such "non-accidental" torts, and states are thus best held to a
stricter standard of care - what I propose to be absolute liability - to be associ-
ated with the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm.
189. Yoo, supra note 27, at 179-80. By contrast, according to Yoo, only a minority of the UN In-
ternational Group of Governmental Experts refused to characterize instances like cyber espi-
onage giving rise to unexpected and unintentional damages as an armed attack, even if dam-
age otherwise amounted to the level of a traditional armed attack. See id. However, it should
be noted that the Tallinn Manual suggests that the International Group of Governmental
Experts could not come to clear agreement on whether a state could be held in breach of its
due diligence obligations if it simply "should have known" about an impending attack. See
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 5, cmt. 11, at 28.
190. See supra Section II.B.
191. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
192. See Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm, supra note 109, arts. 7-9, at 402-12.




2. Scale of Damages
Although a comprehensive discussion of damages and how courts should
calculate them is beyond the scope of this Note, two issues merit attention
here: whether liability can only be applied in the context of cyber attacks that
result in physical damage and whether liability is likely to lead to claims that
are too insignificant.
First, liability for the failure to prevent and redress transboundary harm
need not be limited to instances of physical damage, so long as any nonphysical
damage is of a degree not normally tolerated and not frivolous or trivial.'9 4
Domestic tort law includes many examples where liability for nuisance -a con-
cept similar to the duty to prevent transboundary harms -has been applied to
nonphysical territorial intrusions." Similarly, international law has addressed
nonphysical harm in disputes over radiation exposure from atmospheric weap-
on tests. 196
Second, although some might be concerned about de minimis claims being
brought, market forces are likely to dissuade plaintiffs from asserting claims
that are unlikely to result in significant awards. Applying liability to the duty to
prevent and redress transboundary harm would also deter de minimis claims,
since a court would balance other societal considerations and equitable inter-
ests. Additionally, tort law and the concept of liability are more amenable than
the doctrine of state responsibility to the idea of mitigation of damages, which
would help limit the problem of unreasonably large claims. Unlike state re-
sponsibility, liability for transboundary harm is not concerned with per se vio-
194. See id. at 4, 7-8 (noting that transboundary liability requires a factual inquiry particular to
the circumstances of each incident of whether the damages incurred were "greater than the
mere nuisance or insignificant harm which is normally tolerated" by the international com-
munity (quoting Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur), Sixth Rep. on International Liabilit for
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/428, annex (Mar. 15, 1990))). In addition, in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, com-
pensation was provided even for lost profits and other "intangible" injuries to property
owners. See Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, ¶ 238 (1987); Sergey Ri-
pinsky, Damnum Emergens and Lucrum Cessans in Investment Arbitration: Entering Through
the Back Door, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAw 54 (Andrea K. Bjorldund et al. eds., 2009).
195. For example, noises, smells, and other intangible effects can constitute nuisances, given that
one definition of nuisance is "interference" with another's enjoyment of his or her land. See
ILC Survey, supra note 84, at 23.
196. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, at 79; see also Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J.
99 (June 22).
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lations of particular principles or prohibitions."' The Draft Articles on Trans-
boundary Harm specifically call on states to cooperate in good faith to "mini-
mi[ze] the effects of the risk."' 9 8 When applying societal concerns and engag-
ing an "equitable balance of interest" to determine liability, the Draft Articles on
Transboundary Harm asks courts to weigh "the economic viability of the activity
[causing harm] in relation to the costs of prevention demanded by the states
likely to be affected.""' Liability, in other words, entails a consideration of rea-
sonable harm prevention by both parties.
Relatedly, liability for the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm
applies only to harms not encompassed by the practices of mitigation and pre-
vention.200 The Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm suggest that tribunals
evaluating claims of transboundary harm consider "the degree to which the
states likely to be affected are prepared to contribute to the costs of prevention,"
"the standards of protection which the states likely to be affected apply to the
same or comparable activities," and any standards "applied in comparable re-
gional or international practice."20 ' This means that liability is less likely when
applied to harms that have become routinely tolerated internationally, even if
not accepted. Thus, cyber attacks that are considered routine acts of espionage
would fall outside the scope of liability, since espionage has been tolerated by
the international community for some time.
However, as global norms develop toward states reasonably protecting
their infrastructure against cyber attacks, liability should not arise for harms to
197. Le6n Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Causation and International State Responsibility 19 (Amsterdam
Ctr. of Int'l Law Research Paper No. 2012-07), http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp
-content/uploads/2012/01/Castellanos-Causation-and-International-State-Responsibilityi
.pdf [http://perma.cc/VEE4-MRJ8]; see also HIGGINS, supra note 130, at 163 (noting that re-
sponsible states may owe reparation for a breach of international law, even if no damage has
resulted). The Janes claim provides some interesting insights into how liability should be
conceived of at the damages stage. The Tribunal noted that damages should be calculated
based on the harms suffered by the individuals involved in the dispute, not based on the
amount of damage Mexico had theoretically caused to the United States through its viola-
tion of international law. This may provide a more concrete way to calculate damages than
would be obvious under state responsibility, which would consider more theoretical costs,
for example the cost of intrusion on a state's sovereignty. See Laura M.B. Janes (U.S. v.
Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (Gen. Claims Comm. 1925).
198. SHAw, supra note 117, at 861.
199. Id.
200. It should also be noted that in considering absolute liability specifically, the ILC did consider
suggestions that damages for liability be limited. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 223.




states that take unreasonably limited efforts to protect themselves.202 For ex-
ample, as Obama Administration's report on cyberspace stated, "[S]tates
should recognize and act on their responsibility to protect information infra-
structures and secure national systems from damage or misuse."2 03 But requir-
ing only reasonable mitigation and prevention makes sense as states cannot
possibly prevent all domestic cyber harms from foreign sources.
Although identifying the type of low-intensity cyber attack that would go
beyond a state's baseline duty to protect itself is challenging, the State Depart-
ment has made one threshold clear: North Korea's attack on Sony. In the words
of one senior official, the Sony attack "clearly crossed a threshold" from "web-
site defacement and digital graffiti" to an attack on IT infrastructure.204 In the
State Department's view, this attack fell beyond the bounds of reasonable miti-
gation and prevention, and thus should have given rise to state liability. While
it may be too early to tell, some states seem willing to accept, or at least acqui-
esce to, this view.205
3. Enforcement
Though enforcement is always a challenge in international law, several
characteristics of liability for transboundary harm make it a desirable way to
regulate low-intensity cyber attacks: (i) diplomatic protection and settlement
through ex gratia claims, (2) formal international legal claims, and (3) domestic
suits under exemptions to foreign sovereign immunity. In this way, liability for
transboundary harm proves effective for combating low-intensity cyber attacks,
particularly in light of the alternatives discussed in Part IV.
Turning first to diplomatic protection, the history of international law is
replete with examples of states taking action at the interstate level on behalf of
citizens whose persons or property have been mistreated by another state. As
202. See Gross, supra note 165, at 498; David Fidler, Cyber Norm Development and the Protection of
Critical Infrastructure, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jul. 23, 2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber
/2015/07/23/cyber-norm-development-and-the-protection-of-critical-infrastructure [http://
perma.cc/7ZQG-7P7E].
203. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World,
WHITE HousE (May 2on), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer
/international-strategy-for-cyberspace.pdf [http://perma.cc/RS2L-Z556].
204. Sanger & Schmidt, supra note 51.
205. For example, China condemned the Sony attack, even though it disagreed that the attack
could be definitively attributed to North Korea. See Megha Rajagopalan & Steve Holland,
China Condemns Cyberattacks, But Says No Proof North Korea Hacked Sony, REUTERS (Dec. 22,
2014, 8:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sony-cybersecurity-idUSKBNoKoo6
U2o41222 [http://perma.cc/8GQ9-UQCR].
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Emmerich de Vattel recognized in 1758, "[W]hoever ill-treats a citizen indirect-
ly injures the State, which must protect that citizen."2 06 Today, international in-
vestment law frequently deals with the issue of holding a state liable for harms
caused to private actors. As the tribunal in Mavrommatis Palestine Concession ex-
plained, the act of a state taking up claims to "obtain satisfaction" on behalf of
its subjects injured by or in a foreign state is an."elementary principle of inter-
national law."207
A state's espousal of a "claim of its citizen against the offending govern-
ment" is known as "diplomatic protection." 208 For instance, diplomatic protec-
tion would involve a state asserting a claim on behalf of one of its nationals
against a foreign state when the individual was harmed in the foreign state.209
In contrast to classical diplomatic protection, diplomatic protection for
transboundary harms is in a sense "reverse" diplomatic protection: states make
claims on behalf of their nationals who are injured within their own borders by
foreign states, not outside of them. Indeed, states routinely make informal at-
tempts at protection for harms to property or interests in their territories.2 10 In
2o6. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, art. I cmt. 3, Rep. of the Int'l
Law Comm'n on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/io, at 27 (20o6)
(quoting 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAw APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 136 (C.G.
Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758))).
207. Mavrommatis Palestine Concession (Greece v. U.K.), Decision on Jurisdiction, 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 5, 12 (Aug. 30); see also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Con-
go), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2007 .C.J. 582 (May 24); Paneveezys-Saldutiskis
Railway (Est. v. Lith.), Judgment, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 76, at 5, 6, 16 (Feb. 28) ("In the
opinion of Court, the rule of international law ... [at issue] is that in taking up the case of
one of its nationals, by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings
on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the person of
its nationals respect for the rules of international law.").
208. In these cases, states' claims have typically taken the form of an exchange of diplomatic
notes. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 137, at 2.
209. See id.
210. In the United States, the State Department has long been in the business of representing
"citizen-to-state claims," that is "claims by U.S. citizens against foreign states and vice versa."
Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser's Office: Eight Decades in Peace and
War, ioo GEO. L.J. 1747, 1750 (2012). While in the early days, secretaries of state were known
to use their diplomatic clout to espouse such claims before foreign governments, by the
middle of the nineteenth century the practice had indeed become so common that it over-
whelmed existing resources and prompted the creation of a new role of Claims Clerk. See
Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign
Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (1962). The Office of the Legal Adviser of the State De-
partment ultimately incorporated this role and to this day retains responsibility for manag-
ing various foreign claims. See id. at 634-38. In a related context, the Department of Justice
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the context of transboundary harm, states have most frequently achieved such
protection by negotiating claims of voluntary payments, also known as ex gratia
payments in international law.21 '
Framing claims in international legal terms helps to create a common lan-
guage on which to premise negotiation of voluntary settlements in the first
place.212 Tethering claims to underlying legal considerations may also encour-
age settlement by supplying legitimacy and lawful authority to states exercising
diplomatic power.213
Ex gratia compensation may be particularly effective in the cyber context
because it permits states to redress harms without having to ackowledge
wrongdoing or causation. This can be useful when a state seeks redress for
transboundary harms caused by a state that may be reluctant to acknowledge
fault or causation. Such was the case when the United States, avoiding recogni-
tion of fault, compensated island nations harmed by nuclear weapons tests.2 14
In cases where voluntary compensation does not take place, international
courts can provide an arena for hearing liability claims for violations of the du-
ty to prevent and redress transboundary harm. The ICJ could provide a forum
for formal claims of diplomatic protection for injuries caused to its citizens and
private industries through low-intensity cyber attacks. In recent years, Argenti-
na and Costa Rica have both invoked transboundary harm before the ICJ in the
context of cross-border environmental damages.2 15 In addition, states have
made a variety of diplomatic protection-type claims before the ICJ on behalf of
their nationals. In the Diallo case, for instance, Guinea sought relief for the vio-
adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments under specific jurisdiction
conferred by Congress. Funds for the payment of awards are derived from congressional ap-
propriations, international claims settlements, or the liquidation of foreign assets in the
United States by the Department of the Treasury. See About the Commission, U.S. DEP'T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/about-commission [http://perma.cc/5VYX-389W].
211. See Montjoie, supra note io5, at 512; see also ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶¶ 405-411, 523; Jean-
Marc Sorel, The Concept of "Soft Responsibility?," in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, supra note ioo, at 165 (discussing the relationship between liability and responsibility
in the context of international law).
212. See, e.g., Michael Waibel, The Diplomatic Channel, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, supra note loo, at lo89-90.
213. See id. at 1091-92.
214. See ILC Survey, supra note 84.
215. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judg-
ment, 2015 I.C.J. 1, ¶5 177-217 (Dec. 16); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 101 (Apr. 20).
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lation of the human rights of its nationals by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.216
The Permanent Court of Arbitration could serve as another setting for set-
tling transboundary harm claims stemming from low-intensity cyber attacks.
Some states may be willing to submit to arbitration for even very contentious
matters after some time has passed. Though states often refuse to proceed to
arbitration (or even negotiations) immediately, changes in political circum-
stances may open up room for arbitration eventually. The unusual Rainbow
Warrior case illustrates this phenomenon: France ultimately agreed to arbitra-
tion over damages resulting from its intelligence service blowing up a Green-
peace vessel.2 1 7
Finally, many governments have also recognized liability in their own
courts for tort claims against foreign states. This could serve as an additional
option for providing redress for low-intensity cyber attacks. Although foreign
sovereign immunity may bar certain claims, customary international law on
sovereign immunity may contain an exception for "territorial torts" committed
by one state that affect another state's territory.218 In fact, the UN Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property has affirmed such a
principle.2 19 Guided by this logic, Greece has permitted suits against Germany
for tortious injuries and damage sustained on Greek territory during World
War II, and Italy has refused to recognize sovereign immunity as barring
claims for similar tortious acts committed by Germany on Italian territory.22 0
216. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 324 (June
19); see also Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
217. See Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 11 R.I.A.A. 217 (1990); Geoffrey Palmer, Deputy
Prime Minister of N.Z., Settlement of International Disputes: The "Rainbow Warrior"
Affair, Address to the University of Virginia School of Law (Nov. 3, 1988), in 15 COMMoN-
WEALTH L. BULL. 585 (1989).
218. See HAZEL Fox, G.C. & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 475-83 (3 d ed. 2015).
But see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3).
219. See Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, art. 12, U.N. Doc.
A/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) (not yet in force) ("[A] State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdic-
tion before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which re-
lates to pecuniary compensation for death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of
tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the
State, if the act or omission occurred in whole or in part in the territory of that other State
and if the author of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or
omission.").
220. See Corte Cost., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, Foro it. 2015, I, 1152 (It.); Voitia v. Federal Republic




In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act explicitly codi-
fies such an exception to sovereign immunity for torts carried out on U.S. terri-
tory -including for a wide variety of activities "in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death."2 2 1 Relying on this
exception, in Letelier v. Republic of Chile, a federal court denied sovereign im-
munity to Chile when Chilean officials detonated a car bomb in Washington,
D.C., in 1976.222 More recently, Congress has passed legislation that appears to
broaden this exception and expand state liability to torts not entirely commit-
ted in the United States.223
In this way, recognizing transboundary liability would effectively open up
two levels of redress: first, through liability- including claims heard either
domestically or internationally- and, second, through international state re-
sponsibility in the event that attempts at compensation or settlement fail. 2 24
IV. THE BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
This final Part considers the theoretical and practical benefits of recognizing
liability for low-intensity cyber attacks. Transboundary liability not only offers
a practical solution to the gap for low-intensity cyber attacks but also avoids
many of the downsides of an expansive use of traditional international legal
concepts.
221. 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a)(5) (2012). The Canadian Constitutional Court has recognized a similar
exception to sovereign immunity for territorial torts. Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), 2002 SCC.62 §§ 30-37. The European Convention on State Immunity has as well. Eu-
ropean Convention on State Immunity art. ii, May 16, 1972, 74 E.T.S.
222. See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 1984); see Scott A. Gilmore,
Suing the Surveillance States: The (Cyber) Tort Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 46 CoLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 227 (2015).
223. See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2015). ("A
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in
any case in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for physical injury to
person or property or death occurring in the United States and caused by ... (i) an act of
international terrorism in the United States; and (2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign
state . . . regardless where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred."); see also In re
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the "entire
tort" requirement).
224. See Liability for Injurious Consequences, supra note 1o6, ¶ 41.
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A. Pragmatic Appeal to States and Emphasis on Redress
Low-intensity state-sponsored cyber attacks address situations where states
are unlikely to agree to constrain their activities by overtly declaring such at-
tacks wrongful. Serious enough to cause costly damage, though not quite ex-
pansive enough to meet the scale of a use of force or intervention, these attacks
are increasingly becoming a literal "nuisance" in international law. And yet, as
states increasingly come to see low-intensity cyber attacks as a valuable option
in their foreign policy toolkit,22 5 it is difficult to imagine a world in which they
will sign on to attempts to outlaw low-intensity cyber attacks completely, let
alone accept the expansion of certain prohibitions (such as the use of force and
intervention) to cover them. Liability for transboundary harm encourages
states to internalize the costs of foreign harm associated with their cyber activi-
ties without requiring a new treaty or infringing upon other laws given its ap-
plication only to acts otherwise not prohibited internationally.226
More importantly, there are persuasive reasons to resist declaring all low-
intensity cyber attacks wrongful. As M.B. Akehurst explains, liability has sever-
al features that make it pragmatically preferable to responsibility:
[A] certain stigma attaches to the commission of an unlawful act. States
may therefore be reluctant to pay compensation for wrongful acts be-
cause they are unwilling to admit that they have done anything wrong.
They may be more willing to pay compensation for lawful acts, because
such payments do not imply a confession of wrongdoing. A rule requir-
ing payment of compensation for lawful acts "should make easier a just,
effective and amicable settlement of any liability that may arise." 22 7
225. See, e.g., The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 14 (Apr. 2015), http://
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2o15/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoDCYBER
STRATEGY for web.pdf [http://perma.cc/U7GG-VHLF].
226. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ch. i. For a discussion of the need for international law to rec-
ognize civil liability for torts otherwise governed by international criminal law, see Rebecca
Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 1347 (2016).
227. Akehurst, supra note 114, at 15 (quoting Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special Rapporteur),
Preliminary Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4 / 3 34 (July 4, 1980)). It should be
noted that the United States permits foreigners to bring tort suits against it under select
statutes. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For example, by 20o6,
the United States had paid more than $26 million in compensation for tortious acts commit-
ted by U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan under the U.S. Foreign Claims Act. See Jordan
Walerstein, Coping with Combat Claims: An Analysis of the Foreign Claim's Combat Exclusion,
11 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICT RESOL. 319, 339-40 (2009).
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Moreover, the ILC has noted that accusations of wrongfulness may induce
counterproductive antagonism instead of actual redress for injured parties.22
Greater antagonism would also result from taking any of the other ap-
proaches to addressing low-intensity cyber attacks. Expanding the definition of
the use of force would allow states to label low-intensity cyber attacks as
"armed attacks" and respond with force.2 29 Even declaring all low-intensity
cyber attacks just to be violations of non-intervention and sovereignty would
permit states to take excessive countermeasures under state responsibility. Al-
ternatively, subsuming low-intensity cyber attacks into the legally unclear cate-
gory of espionage would require states to accept significant damage from for-
eign covert action and international law would remain unable to address it.
Categorizing these sorts of attacks as espionage would also permit states to
conduct in-kind low-intensity counter attacks, provided that these, too, stay at
the level of cyber espionage. Either of these approaches would also fail to com-
pensate for certain harms to private actors, such as the tens of millions of dol-
lars in damages to companies like Sony.
Approaches invoking state responsibility would present their own con-
cerns. For instance, holding states responsible for too many cyber attacks might
encourage states to impose draconian restrictions on internet use. Moreover,
expanding preexisting categories of law to proscribe low-intensity attacks could
create havoc in areas of law unrelated to cyber attacks. And broadening the
concept of intervention or sovereignty could result in severe problems for
NGOs and other supporters of human rights who engage in what might be
called low-level coercive activity.2 30
In addition, it is difficult to justify imposing state responsibility directly in
cases where it is unclear whether an attack inadvertently passed through a
state's borders due to the interconnectivity of the internet2 31 or has been inaccu-
rately attributed.2 32 After all, responsibility is one of the most serious notions in
international law and one that opens the door to ICJ and Security Council
sanctions, outcasting, and remedies implicating a host of other legal rights and
international obligations. Weakening or fundamentally altering state responsi-
228. See Liability for Injurious Consequences, supra note 1o6, ¶ 42.
229. The United States has long maintained that a violation of Article 2(4) triggers Article 51. See
Koh, supra note 49, at 3-4.
230. See Hathaway, supra note 35, at 49 (noting that the gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51
"prevents an endless process of retaliations for small offenses").
231. See Michael N. Schmitt & M. Christopher Pitts, Cyber Countermeasures and Effects on Third
Parties: The International Legal Regime, 14 BALTIC Y.B. INT'LL. 1, 2 (2015).
232. See, e.g., Kenneth Geers, The Challenge of Cyber Attack Deterrence, 26 COMPUTER L. & SECU-
RITY REV. 298, 301-02 (2010).
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bility by creating a system that would be difficult to enforce or even compre-
hend in the cyber context would hardly be productive in the long term. 23 3
In contrast, a liability approach, through its varying standards of care, can
better account for low-intensity cyber attacks. Unlike an approach that invokes
sovereignty or non-intervention, a dual liability regime provides a tailored ap-
proach to different cases depending on varying degrees of attribution. Similar-
ly, liability takes into consideration varying degrees of reasonable conduct, par-
ticularly for attacks carried out by non-state actors via a state's infrastructure. 23 4
In addition, because liability works backwards from harm, as opposed to via an
abstract principle for all breaches (intentional or not), it does not need to apply
in all cases of theoretical injury to a state's sovereignty.235 In this sense, liability
supports a system where states are, even if not absolutely prohibited from
launching attacks, at least compelled to account for damages and take reasona-
ble steps to prevent cyber harms abroad.236
This proposed dual liability regime is even more attractive in light of an-
other alternative: charging individual state officials or state-hired individuals
for cyber harms (instead of states directly). For example, in March 2016, the
United States indicted several Iranian state hackers for a range of cyber attacks
on U.S. companies. Critics have rightly pointed out that these indictments
233. Another problem with state responsibility, unlike liability, is that (at least in theory and ac-
cording to the ILC) it is supposed to be concerned with all subjective violations of interna-
tional law, even those that do not involve material damage. See Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, supra note 18, art. 31, cmt. 7, at 92.
234. See, e.g., Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 647-48 (Wash. 1954) (noting that tort law
often limits the "defendant's duty to insure safety ... to certain consequences" and compares
damages with those experienced by neighbors (citations omitted)).
235. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 27; see also Foster, 268 P.2d at 647 (describing the extent of
liability incurred through ultrahazardous activities); Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 18, arts. 30-31, at 216-31 (outlining the obligations of States responsible for "in-
ternationally wrongful act[s]"). In addition, and in some aspects paradoxically, traditional
responsibility may actually require more substantial compensation than even "strict liability"
does, since once responsibility is found, total reparation is required and is not likely to make
any balancing approach. See BARsozA, supra note 114, at 92.
236. Some experts have recently proposed a "cyber insurance" program, a cousin to the idea of
state liability for cyber attacks. See Nathan Bruschi, Maybe Wall Street Has the Solution to
Stopping Cyber Attacks, WIRED (June 2, 2016, 4:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/2oi6/o6
/cyber-bonds [http://perma.cc/3G3B-TY8G].
237. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Charges Against Seven Iranians for Conducting Coordinated Campaign of
Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Financial Sector on Behalf of Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Sponsored Entities (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhatt
an-us-attorney-announces-charges-against-seven-iranians-conducting-coordinated [http://
perma.cc/HD82- 4 V4 V].
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may set a problematic precedent for U.S. officials traveling abroad.238 In certain
cases, individual indictments can also divert attention away from the "true"
source of liability: the state that actually ordered and developed the cyber attack
in the first place. Even if a government could capture alleged cyber criminals, it
would end up bypassing the party with "deeper pockets" that would be most
able to change broad-ranging cyber policies.
B. Clarification of the Law of Countermeasures
Recognizing transboundary liability also elucidates the duties of states en-
gaging in increasingly common "hack-backs," or what some refer to (some-
times incorrectly) as countermeasures. 39 According to the Tallinn Manual, "a
State injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to proportionate
countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible
State."24 0 Countermeasures are nonviolent actions taken in response to another
state's wrongful act241 in order to induce compliance with international law.242
However, under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, countermeasures must
be reversible "as far as possible,"'24 3 proportionate,244 and can only be taken
after demands for the cessation of the wrongful conduct fail.s
Recognizing the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm and lia-
bility for low-intensity cyber attacks helps mitigate the problem of the overuse
of cyber countermeasures, while at the same time not eliminating an important
state tool. Liability requires states to seek settlement through compensation be-
238. See, e.g., Robert M. Lee, Feds Set a Risky Precedent by Indicting 7 Iranian Hackers, WIRED (Mar.
26, 2016, 7:oo AM), http://www.wired.com/2o6/03/feds-set-risky-precedent-indicting-7
-iranian-hackers [http://perma.cc/8A4N-5DER].
239. See, e.g.,. Schmitt, supra note 34, at 703; Schmitt & Pitts, supra note 231.
240. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, r. 9, at 56.
241. See Gablikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 3, ¶f 83-84
(Sept. 25).
242. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, art. 49, at 328.
243. Id.
244. See id. art. 51, at 341; Air Servs. Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, ¶ 83 (Dec. 9, 1978).
245. See id. art. 52, at 345; Gablkovo-Nagymaros, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. ¶ 84. The law of counter-
measures is reflected in customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 127, ¶ 248 (June 27);
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (May
24); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/o4/5,
Award, ¶ 124-25 (Nov. 21, 2007).
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fore engaging in any countermeasure.2 46 This requirement only amplifies what
is already a condition inherent in the law of countermeasures: to first call on
the state alleged to have caused harm to make reparations.24 7 If compensation
for transboundary harm is not provided after a significant period of de-
escalation and recourse to domestic and international legal processes for set-
tlement, then a state may be held responsible, and countermeasures may be
considered, as at that point a wrongful international act would have been
committed.2 48
FIGURE 4.
PERMISSIBLE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES FOR CYBER ATTACKS, INCLUDING UNDER
A LIABILITY FRAMEWORK
Level of Attack Possible Response
Armed attack Self-defense (use of force)
Use of force short of "armed Countermeasure (including attempts
attack" & acts of intervention first at settlement)
Low-intensity attacks Compensation or other settlement, and if
not, potentially countermeasure
Another way of understanding the requirement to seek settlement before
launching a countermeasure comes from the work of the ILC. The Draft Articles
on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities indicate that
"states are to co-operate in good faith in trying to prevent such activities from
causing significant transboundary injury" as well as in mitigating the "effects of
the risk," a notion that is also found in international environmental law. 4 ' The
246. See Hathaway, supra note 35, at 40-41, 46-47, 49. ("It is important that lawyers and policy-
makers be careful not to create bigger problems in other areas of international law when try-
ing to solve the threshold problem in cyber by engaging in over-interpretation of broadly
applicable legal principles."). It should also be noted that if the threshold for use of force is
lowered to cover low-intensity cyber attacks, this effectively means that a state cannot re-
spond in kind to such an attack through a countermeasure.
247. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, art. 52, cmt. 1, at 345.
248. Analogous concerns in domestic law, particularly the need to maintain public order and pre-
vent retaliatory self-help, drove the development of tort law and liability for breaches of par-
ticular duties. See ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 18.
249. SHAW, supra note 117, at 861.
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benefits of this approach may be particularly important when it comes to the
cross-border effects that could stem from a range of different activities in con-
temporary society, not all of which could give rise to countermeasures under an
expansive definition of sovereignty. These notions also square well with the
UN Charter, which calls on "parties to any dispute . .. [to] first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement . .. or other peaceful means."2 50
C. Recognition of Duties Owed to Third Parties
Finally, applying liability for transboundary harms to low-intensity cyber
attacks may clarify obligations owed to third-party states. Commentators have
struggled to articulate the obligations -if any -that states have to third parties
when engaging in countermeasures. ' For instance, one line of analysis sug-
gests that if a state launches a countermeasure against a second state and the
countermeasure affects a third state, the third state has no recourse -unless the
attack violates particular rights owed to that third state under a treaty.252
Recognizing the duty to prevent transboundary harm would affirm that li-
ability fully extends to countermeasures affecting third parties. This is particu-
larly important because cyber offenses are likely to cause unintended damag-
es.25 3 For instance, as the former head of the National Security Agency has
recognized, unlike traditional weapons, malware and other cyber weapons do
not self-destruct upon impact. 254 As a result, absent proper design, cyber
250. U.N. Charter art. 33; see also U.N. Charter art. 2(3) ("All Members shall settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered.").
251. See e.g., Gross, supra note 165, at 501 n.123; Jay P. Kesan & Ruperto Majuca, Optimal Hack-
back, 84 CHI.-IIENT L. REv. 831, 837 (2009); Schmitt & Pitts, supra note 231 at 6-8.
252. See, e.g., Schmitt & Pitts, supra note 231, at 6-8 (distinguishing countermeasures that affect
third party interests from those that affect third party rights, such as treaty rights).
253. See Raymond et al., supra note 181, at 8 (pointing out that Stuxnet was likely designed to
target Iranian centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, but eventually infected
systems in several countries); Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY
FAIR (Mar. 2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/03/stuxnet-201104 [http://
perma.cc/6TLG-X79Y] (describing the spread of Stuxnet, a self-replicating computer virus,
through thousands of computers around the world).
254. See Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare, CBS NEWS (Jun. 4,
2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare
-04-06-2012 [http://perma.cc/Z2KA-BDME]. For example, in the weeks following the al-
leged U.S. and Israeli Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, researchers identified the
Stuxnet worm on hundreds of thousands of computers outside of Iran, in countries as dis-
perse as Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the United States.
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weapons can effect repetitive damage that is far broader than intended. Liabil-
ity is particularly equipped to deal with the problem of unintended conse-
quences in cyber attacks. First, liability takes a somewhat less restrictive view of
causation than responsibility. 255 Second, liability, especially an absolute liability
standard, emphasizes that states have strict duties to prevent all low-intensity
harms to third states, regardless of whether the state launching the attack "took
care" to guard against such third-party harms or intended to hit only one tar-
get. 256
Recognizing liability for damages to third parties resulting from illegal
hack-backs or lawful countermeasures also sheds light on another unresolved
issue in the literature: whether states have a right to property in international
law, and thus a right not to have their property or property in their territory
damaged.2 1 While not answering the question directly, liability for trans-
boundary harm suggests that low-level torts and cross-border property damag-
es are not without limitation or redress in international law simply because
they occur outside of armed conflict, intervention, or the use of force.
CONCLUSION
Liability for the duty to prevent and redress transboundary harm can fill
the gap in public international law for low-intensity cyber attacks. States are
not only subject to the standard of due diligence in preventing transboundary
cyber harms originating from non-state sources, but also subject to absolute
liability in terms of refraining from causing harm through attacks themselves -
even when these attacks are not otherwise outlawed directly.
Jarrad Shearer, W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC (July 13, 2010), http://www.symantec.com/security
response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-0 714 00- 3123- 9 9 [http://perma.cc/9L35-ARNG]. This
resulted in fear that the malware would "bring industrial society to a halt," given that the
worm targeted programmable-logic controllers common to many industries (e.g., oil extrac-
tion, dams, energy production, water distribution, and aviation). Gross, supra note 253.
255. See Castellanos-Jankiewicz, supra note 197, at 52 (noting that responsibility tends to adhere
to proximate causation over direct causation); ILC Survey, supra note 84, ¶ 25.
256. See Brilmayer, supra note 182, at 442. Taken from another perspective, recognizing the duty
to prevent transboundary harm to third parties simply applies notions of precaution owed
under other bodies of law, such as the Laws of Armed Conflict (e.g., the principles of distinc-
tion and proportionality), to the low-intensity cyber realm. State practice also seems to sup-
port recognition of liability to third states, given that many state cyber weapons are carefully
designed to attack precisely one target and to avoid replication outside of target environ-
ments.
257. See John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 464, 491-97(2014); Peter Tzeng, Comment,. The State's Right to Property Under International Law, 125




Thus, I argue for an approach that avoids both expanding preexisting cate-
gories of wrongful state action and leaving all low-intensity cyber attacks out-
side of the fold of international law entirely. Liability for the duty to prevent
transboundary harm not only encourages peaceful settlement and de-
escalation, but also offers a more realistic approach for addressing the cross-
border intrusions that are becoming increasingly common in the contemporary
era.
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